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This study explores the relationship between economic development, social 
mobility, elites, and regime formation. I argue that the genesis of regime formation, in 
general, and of democratic regimes, in particular, is determined by the type of economic 
structure a society possesses, on the one hand, and on the degree the to which demands 
from disfranchised groups do or do not pose a substantial threat to the interests of elites 
who occupy the upper strata of the social and economic status hierarchy. 
Second I demonstrate that the dynamics of transition to wider political 
participation, as the core element of a democratic system of governance, and the survival 
of such change are different. In what follows I illustrate that some factors that have been 
found to dampen the chances for wider participation or have been found to be unrelated 
to onset of a democratic system of governance have considerable impacts on the 
durability of the democratic regimes. In a nutshell, the analysis points to the positive 
effects of mineral wealth and income inequality on the prospects of a democratic 
survival. Using a cross-national time series data set for all countries for the period 
between 1960 and 1999 I put the hypotheses to the test. I use binary logit, ordered logit, 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) to delineate the link between socioeconomic changes 
and the transition to wider participation. Survival analyses are employed to test for what 
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 As the conflict between the USA-led coalition forces and Iraqi insurgency 
intensifies, the hopes for a stable democratic Iraq fade away. Scholars and policy makers 
alike have pointed to the ethnic and religious fragmentation, the absence of a strong civil 
society, a hostile political culture (i.e., Islam), and abundant oil-revenues to substantiate 
their claim that the prospects for a durable democracy in a country like Iraq are dim. The 
fledgling democratic regime in Iraq is just one of the new democracies that have emerged 
in the last decades. 
The democratization wave that has been identified by Samuel Huntington as the 
third wave has brought about democratic regimes with large amount of variation. Within 
less than two decades “between 1974 and 1990 more than thirty countries in Southern 
Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from authoritarian to 
democratic system of government” (Huntington 1991-1992, 579). The trend, however, 
has not stopped. In the last decade or so several other authoritarian regimes ranging from 
Albania to Indonesia have joined the democratic camp. 
Furthermore, contrary to what conventional wisdom would expect, several natural 
resource-rich Muslim countries have been moving toward greater participation. Besides 
the fledgling democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq that came into being as a product of 
the USA-led invasions and the major regime change in Indonesia that ended decades-long
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authoritarian system of governance, movements toward democracy in several natural 
resource-abundant Muslim countries (e.g., Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman) in a 
region that “has long been perceived as a site of entrenched authoritarianism” (Bellin 
2002, 8) pose a challenge to the conventional wisdom. More specifically in addition to 
the democratization events in Latin America a region that has long been identified by 
some scholars as not a fertile ground for the emergence of democratic regimes due 
mainly to its “Catholic-Thomistic” culture (Wiarda 1992, 6; also see Huntington 1984) 
recent movements toward democracy in countries like Indonesia and Jordan bring the 
current theories of democratization into question. 
The recent democratization trend has generated a large number of democratic 
regimes with significant amount of variation. The regimes that have taken an important 
step toward democracy range from countries with substantial agricultural sector such as 
Guatemala and El Salvador to highly industrialized countries such as Spain, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. In addition to oil-rich democratic countries such as Venezuela, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Norway, democratic transitions in several resource-rich countries such as 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia have increased the number of democratic regimes with 
abundant natural resources, two variables that the conventional wisdom has deemed to be 
intrinsically at odds with one another.  
The movements in countries that have been regarded with little or no prospects 
for democratization call the current approaches and their findings into question. What 
accounts for movements toward democracy in countries with high levels of economic 
inequality, a weak bourgeoisie, and substantial natural resources? More importantly, with 
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many authoritarian regimes joining the democratic camp and many others moving toward 
introducing democratic institutions (e.g., Jordan, Algeria, Nigeria) one wonders about the 
future of the recent wave of democratization. Despite the considerable ground gained in 
the last decades in favor of democracy, how sustainable or vulnerable are the new 
democratic regimes? Recalling the authoritarian backlashes in the 1960s one wonders 
what are the prospects for democratic survival in countries with diverging socioeconomic 
structures. Will they survive economic and political crises or as in the past will they 
prove to be ephemeral? 
Despite a large body of literature on the genesis of democratic regimes, scholars 
have failed to reach a consensus on the mechanisms through which previously 
disfranchised segments of a society become participants in the political decision-making 
body. Following Lipset’s (1959) seminal work, Some Social Requisites of Democracy, 
scholars have engaged in a heated debate over the dynamics of democratization. 
Although some (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000) have 
challenged the validity of the economic development-democracy hypothesis it 
nonetheless “has been tested most thoroughly” (Vanhanen 1997, 21). The modernization 
hypothesis first advanced by Lipset and later extended and tested by others contends that 
countries with higher levels of wealth, literacy, urbanization, and industrialization are 
more likely to establish stable, effective, and legitimate democratic regimes. 
Although the modernization theory does not explicitly state the role of widely 
distributed resources in democratization implicit is the hypothesis that economic 
development functions as an equalizing force by shifting the shape of social structure 
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from a “an elongated pyramid, with a large lower class base, to a diamond with a growing 
middle class” (Lipset 1959, 83). The link between economic equality and democracy 
becomes clearer in Vanhanen’s statement. Economic development, Vanhanen (1997, 24) 
argues, lays the groundwork for democratic regimes to the extent it leads to widely 
distributed power resources: “…democratization takes place under conditions in which 
power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to 
suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony.” In Democracy and Redistribution 
Boix (2003) elegantly spells out the link between the asset specificity and regime type. 
But economic equality still occupies the cornerstone of Boix’s theory. Economic 
equality, he asserts (2003, 3), not only facilitates a peaceful transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic system of governance characterized by universal 
suffrage, but also helps sustain a democratic regime. 
Proponents of the equality-democracy hypothesis (e.g., Dahl 1971; Muller 1995; 
1997; Ember et al. 1997; Vanhanen 1997; Boix 2003) have pointed to the inimical effects 
of inequalities of various forms on democratization.1 The rationale behind this 
assumption is that power concentration provides incentives for the owners of power (i.e., 
resources) to opt for authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, and derail the democratic 
process on the other out of fear that the majority (the poor) will pressure the state for 
redistribution. Pointing to the distributional aspects of democracy, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001, 938), for instance, conclude that democracy becomes a preferred 
outcome for the poor since “…in democracies [they] impose higher taxes on the rich than 
                                                 
1 For an extensive survey see Midlarsky (1997).  
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in nondemocratic societies. This…simultaneously [gives] the rich an incentive to oppose 
democracy.” In a similar vein, Boix (2003, 3, emphasis added) argues “…democracy 
prevails when either economic equality or capital mobility are high in a given country. As 
the distribution of assets and income become more balanced among individuals the 
redistributive impact of democracy diminishes and the probability of a peaceful transition 
from an authoritarian regime to universal suffrage increases.” 
Theories that bridge equality and democracy in general and those that put 
emphasis on the redistributive aspects of a democratic system of governance in particular 
suffer from two major setbacks. First, equality may not be a necessary condition for 
democratization. Second, the assumption that the poor will levy high taxes on the rich in 
a democratic regime may not hold under all circumstances. Therefore, “heavy reliance on 
egalitarianism as a necessary condition for the emergence of political democracy requires 
much more scrutiny” (Crenshaw 1997, 106). 
First, economic inequality exists in all forms of regimes and asset redistribution is 
not a defining feature of democracies. On the contrary the most drastic redistributive 
policies have been undertaken by authoritarian regimes. Land reform as the most 
influential remedy to the most obvious form of inequality in developing and less-
developed countries has been implemented to sustain authoritarian regimes. The 
beneficiaries of Marcos’ land reform in the Philippines in the early 1970s, for instance, 
became “a significant source of rural support” for the authoritarian regime until its 
collapse in 1986 (Mackie and Villegas 1993, 104). Similarly, the authoritarian Latin 
American and Caribbean countries that implemented successful land reforms (e.g., 
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Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico) did not experience any substantial political regime changes after 
redistribution of the land (see, for instance, Meyer 1989; Dorner 1992). Likewise, non-
democratic governments in South Korea and Taiwan redistributed 50 and 24.6 percent of 
the arable land in 1949 and 1949-1953, respectively, to defuse rural protests and 
insurrections that arose following land reforms in North Korea and Mainland China 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Nonetheless, neither country experienced any 
substantial political regime change until the mid-1980s (with the exception of South 
Korea’s short-lived democratic stint in 1960).  
Second, the assumption that “the median voter, who is a poor individual, will set 
taxes to maximize his income” (Boix 2003, 23; see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2001) 
in a democratic regime may not hold. Transition to democracy does not necessarily 
change the balance of power between previously disfranchised segments of a society and 
powerful groups. Nel tests whether “higher levels of inequality lead, in democracies at 
least, to government initiatives to redistribute wealth through progressive tax systems” 
(2005, 23) and concludes that “it is naïve to believe that the introduction of competitive 
elections and extension of civil liberties would of itself negate the impact of hegemony 
and promote redistribution” (2005, 36). Nel’s findings suggest that the transition to 
electoral democracy does not help the poor but rather strengthens the rich and 
concentrates income (also, see Bollen and Jackman 1985, 448). Overall the discussion 
casts doubt on the proposed link between democracy and the power of median voters (the 
poor) to levy high taxes on the rich.  
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Third, the assumption that inequalities generate discontents and frustration among 
members of a society, thereby undermine the legitimacy of the regime, requires further 
scrutiny. As Bollen and Jackman (1985, 440, also see Bollen and Jackman 1995) have 
aptly stated “…to have such an effect, inequality has to be perceived as unjust, and there 
is no reason to believe that inequality automatically generates perceptions of inequity.” 
They continue, “even in the presence of high inequality, regimes can maintain a degree of 
legitimacy by invoking other political symbols – for example, those that appeal to 
nationalists sentiments” (ibid., 452). 
To sum up, modernization theory and its extensions that have proposed a negative 
relationship between inequality and democracy rests upon some shaky assumptions. The 
argument undermines the role of elites in a socioeconomic structure and overstates the 
power of lower classes, presumably empowered by the introduction of democratic 
institutions, to impose their will upon the rich. The upper classes often have the 
capabilities and the willingness to manipulate the system in such a way that blocks 
redistribution. As Dorner (1992, 35) states more clearly “so long as people whose 
interests are threatened by reform hold power, they will find ways of assuring that 
legislation will be ineffective.” That is a change in de jure political power (i.e., transition 
to a democratic system of governance) does not necessarily result in a change in de facto 
power. On the contrary, the empowerment of the majority (the poor) as a function of a 
change in the regime (i.e., democratization) leads elites to invest in de facto political 
power to offset their loss of de jure political power. In other words economic institutions 
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and the elites’ position in the system of social stratification remain intact even after a 
change in the distribution of de jure political power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a). 
In this study I propose a theory of regime change and democratization that 
emphasizes power differences between the upper and lower classes and establishes that 
the transformation of elites’ and/or lower classes’ interests, as a function of economic 
transformation, is the key behind the transition to and survival of more inclusive regimes. 
Building upon the previous studies (e.g., Lipset 1959; Burton et al. 1992; Boix 2003; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006b; Higley and Burton 2006) and putting threat and social 
mobility concepts into the foundations of the theory, I delineate the complex relationship 
between income source, economic transformation, and elites in fomenting wider 
participation and help sustain a change toward it. 
I argue that the emergence of power-sharing institutions and their durability are 
determined primarily by the interactions between the upper and lower groups in a social 
structure. More specifically, the emergence and durability of democratic regimes become 
a function of a type of economic development that provides alternative avenues to the 
power without directly threatening the established elites’ vested interests. The argument, 
therefore, is based upon the nature of wealth a society possesses, on the one hand, and 
whether groups that occupy the upper level of a social structure support the democratic 
change, on the other. 
As such the theory and the empirical findings provide support for the 
modernization theory, yet they suggest a different causal mechanism. Industrialization, as 
Modernization theory contends, paves the way to wider participation not by leading to an 
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increase in wealth and reducing the gap between the poor and the rich but rather by 
empowering the poor without endangering the elites’ established positions on the 
socioeconomic ladder. More specifically, it is my contention that the causal relationship 
between economic development and democratization is not necessarily a function of 
increased wealth. The relationship between an increase in wealth and democratization is 
conditioned by whether such an increase provides alternative paths for the lower classes 
to gain strength without threatening the established elites’ position within the system. As 
such, democratization becomes a function of two intertwined factors: The nature of 
wealth that enables lower classes to move up within the social and political structure, and 
the degree to which groups that occupy the upper levels of the social ladder are not 
directly threatened by such movement. The theory proposed in this study, hence, has 
strong elitist elements and stresses the vitality of socioeconomic transformations that 
provide alternative paths to power, thereby reducing the nature and degree of threat to 
elites posed by disfranchised groups gaining a voice in the system. The elites’ role 
becomes more visible with respect to the chances to sustain a democratic regime. A 
transition to wider participation, through the introduction of democratic institutions is not 
likely to survive if it is not supported by the upper classes. The pressure from lower 
classes, emboldened by the introduction of democratic institutions, will generate conflict 
between the poor and the rich in which the latter are more likely to prevail. 
Despite a large body of literature on democracy and democratization the elites’ 
role in the process has not been subject to cross-country empirical analyses. With very 
few exceptions [e.g., Higley and Burton (2006) provide a detailed comparative historical 
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analyses of elites’ role in democratization], current large-N cross-country studies have 
often ignored the crucial link between elites and democratic regimes. By proposing a 
theoretical framework to dissect the transition to and survival of democratic regimes, I 
bring the elites back to the picture. 
The theoretical framework proposed in this study further sheds light on the 
inconclusive debate over which class is responsible for bringing about democratic 
regimes. Contrary to Modernization theory, which emphasizes micro dynamics of regime 
formation, the proponents of structural approach, introduced by Moore (1966) and then 
adapted, criticized, and tested by others, draws attention to the deep class relationships to 
trace the genesis of regime formation. The crucial role assigned to the bourgeoisie, 
epitomized in Moore’s famous (1966, 418) “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” statement, 
has been criticized by some (e.g., Rueschemeyer et al. 1992) on the grounds that the role 
of the bourgeoisie in bringing about democratic regimes is limited to procedural 
democracy: It is a working class empowered by capitalist development that pushes for 
full democratization. 
This study demonstrates that it is not a specific class that plays the key role in 
bringing about democratic regimes. Rather any group that occupies the higher echelons 
of a socioeconomic ladder can become an agent of stagnation and block the transition if 
the lower classes’ demands are perceived as a serious threat to its position in the system. 
As such the theory gives insights to Bellin’s (2000) argument that support for democracy 
is not universal but rather conditioned by each group’s position in the system. However, 
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this study also shows, in accordance with Boix (2003), that the type of economic 
development and the nature of income a society possess matter. 
Besides overlooking the crucial role played by elites for any substantial change to 
occur in a society, the current theories lump transition to and survival of a democratic 
system of governance together and fail to sort out the different dynamics at play. With 
very few exceptions (i.e., Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Collier 1999; Przeworski et al. 
2000) scholars tend to blur factors that play a role in transition to democracy with those 
that influence the survival of a democratic regime. I establish that once a country takes a 
substantial step toward wider participation the logic and the rules of the game undergo 
substantial changes. Consequently, the negative effect of some variables (i.e., natural 
resources) vanishes as a function of a change in the regime. On the contrary, the evidence 
from several resource-rich countries and from empirical analyses clearly illustrates that 
the relationship between abundant natural resources and democracy is much more 
complex than the current studies have argued: Natural-resource wealth can become a 
blessing for a democratic system of governance by helping to sustain the regime. In a 
similar vein, economic inequality helps prolong a democratic system of governance by 
inducing elites to stick by the rules of the game. As such, this study fills the gap by 
showing the different dynamics at play in transition to and survival of democratic 
regimes and by bringing the elites back into the equation. 
This study further makes a contribution to the current democracy literature by 
analyzing all substantial steps toward wider participation. Emphasizing participation and 
inclusiveness as the key elements of democratic systems of governance, I show that 
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current studies have overlooked important political changes in several countries simply 
because they have not passed some threshold value on a democratization scale. 
Dichotomous measures, as employed in the current literature (Przeworski et al. 2000; 
Boix 2003), fail to distinguish between countries that have made a substantial 
improvement toward democracy and those that have not. Dividing countries into two 
broad camps –democracies and non-democracies- ignores the variation within these two 
broads categories. Such coding, for instance, lumps Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, and 
Saudi Arabia together and fails to distinguish substantial differences in, say, Saudi 
Arabia’s polity and that of Jordan. The Jordanian liberalization process of early 1990s, as 
“one of the most significant experiments in political liberalization in the Arab world” 
(Mufti 1999, 100), has resulted in several important changes ranging from legalization of 
political parties, competitive elections, ending martial law that was in effect for more 
than 20 years, to laying the groundwork for the emergence of relatively free and open 
press (Ryan and Schwedler 2004, 138, 141). Obviously by the standard indices of 
democracy most of these events are far from a transition to democracy. A democratic 
transition, however, does not come over night and as Epstein et al. (2006, 552) have aptly 
put it “democracy is a process, not an end state. And it is often the case, the journey is 
more important than the destination.” Therefore, treating regimes with some important 
democratic elements or “a considerable element of popular influence”  (to borrow 
Lipset’s (1960, 48) words), the same as regimes with essentially no democratic properties 
is fundamentally misleading. 
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The study proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I propose a theory of regime 
change and explain how the nature of income and the transformation of a socioeconomic 
structure facilitate or hinder the prospects for wider participation. This chapter also 
substantiates the link between economic development, the nature of wealth, and elites’ 
role by providing details from several democratization cases.  
In chapter III I provide details on democratization events from countries with 
large agricultural sectors (e.g., El Salvador), as well as a more detailed case study on 
democratization in Taiwan, a country that has achieved a high level of industrialization. 
These cases reveal extensive variation and information regarding the dynamics of 
economic structure, elites, and democracy. This analysis should shed light on the crucial 
role of the transformation of the elites’ interests for a democratic regime to emerge and 
endure. 
In chapter IV, I test the hypotheses derived in chapter II regarding the dynamics 
of democratic transition. Employing binary logit, ordered logit, and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) methods I analyze the data for all countries with available data for the period 
between 1960 and 1999. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the results.  
In chapter V, I analyze the dynamics at play in survival of a change toward 
democracy. I first spell out the complex relationship between some variables that the 
conventional wisdom has deemed inimical to the emergence and survival of a democratic 
system of governance. More specifically, I propose a theoretical framework from which I 
derive testable propositions with regard to the complex relationship between abundant 
natural resources (especially oil-wealth), economic inequality, and democratic survival. I 
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contend that the effect of these variables undergoes substantial changes as a consequence 
of the institutional changes that accompany democratization so that oil-wealth and 
economic inequality, contrary to conventional wisdom, play a constructive role in 
sustaining a change toward wider participation. 
The hypotheses derived in chapter V are put to the test in chapter VI. I analyze all 
changes toward democracy (CTD) between 1960 and 1999 and employ a set of survival 
models to analyze what factors account for survival of a change toward democracy. The 
analyses of the cross-country global sample reveal striking findings. Although the 
findings confirm the modernization hypothesis, they suggest a rather different casual 
mechanism: Increased wealth, as a function of industrialization, lays the groundwork for 
democracy, and helps sustain it, by providing alternative paths for power, thereby 
reducing the threat from below and securing the elite’s position. 
The effect of mineral wealth is much more complex than the way it has been 
depicted in the current literature. Oil-wealth decreases the chances to achieve greater 
participation yet this effect becomes positive once a country passes a certain threshold. 
That is, the demands from lower classes for a voice in the system, in a country with large 
extractive resources, alert the upper classes, thereby making them become an agent of 
stagnation and block the transition. Nonetheless, once such a country takes a step toward 
greater participation, large oil-revenues help elites by placating them and by generating a 
large sum to overcome economic and political bottlenecks. 
Likewise, consistent with the theoretical expectation, high levels of economic 
inequality and elites support for a change toward democracy substantially decrease the 
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odds of an authoritarian backlash. As such the findings provide support for Burton et al.’s 
(1992) and Higley and Burton’s (2006) main proposition that “the sine qua non” element 
of liberal democracies is elite support. The findings pose a challenge to the current 
studies that have stressed the inimical effects of oil-wealth and economic inequality on 
democracy. 




A THEORY OF REGIME FORMATION AND DEMOCRACY 
The theoretical framework laid out in this study rests on the assumption that the 
source of conflict among individuals and groups alike comes from competition over 
power and resources. A society is considered to be composed of upper and lower classes. 
The terms upper classes, ruling elite, rich, and governing coalition are used 
interchangeably. All refer to groups or individuals that are in control of substantial 
portions of the nations wealth and occupy the top echelons of the social order. Because 
they control important shares of national wealth, they can “substantially” and “regularly” 
affect the political outcomes (Burton et al. 1992, 8). Similarly, the terms lower classes 
and poor are used interchangeably in reference to those not at the top of the social order 
and not in possession of enough economic resources to provide a viable challenge and/or 
alternative to the upper classes’ control over power. Perhaps no society has such clear 
borders between upper and lower classes; some will fall in between on the social ladder. 
However, for analytical purposes one can divide a society into two broad categories; 
upper and lower classes.2  
This definition departs from Burton et al.’s (1992) and O’Donnel and Schmitter’s 
(1986) elite definitions.3 I concur with Burton et al. (1992, 8) that elites are characterized
                                                 
2 Previous studies (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; 2006a; 2006b) have adopted a similar 
strategy for the purpose of theory construction. Also see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003); Tilly (1978); and 
Ilchman and Uphoff (1969).  
3 Burton et al. (1992) and O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986) emphasize the role of “elite settlement” and 
“elite pacts,” respectively, in the formation of democratic regimes.  
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by their ability “to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially.” Their 
definitions, however, does not distinguish between powerful groups or individuals from 
the lower classes and upper classes. The lower classes’ struggle against the upper classes 
to achieve a higher rank on the socioeconomic scale might produce some organized 
movement from which an elite group emerges and articulates the demands from below. 
However, in a given social and political order there exist some groups that are able to 
“regularly” and “substantially” affect the political outcomes and they might face 
challenges/demands from lower classes. Obviously, the outcome of such challenge will 
be determined and shaped through interactions between the representatives of the lower 
classes (i.e., the opposition elites) and the upper classes. However, elite in this study 
refers only to those who already occupy the upper level of a social structure. With that 
assumption we can develop a better understanding of how new groups emerge that ask 
for a say in the system and their rising demands result. 
Actors (groups and individuals) seek to enhance their position in the system 
through asset utilization. More specifically, one’s location in the system is a factor of 
assets such as wealth, personal origin, age/gender, and special proficiency (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003). Of these assets, however, wealth is of vital importance since it can 
easily be translated into political power. Actors with greater wealth are likely to be more 
influential and have more say in the decision-making process. Therefore, one can dissect 
a society into actors whose positions in a political system are mainly a factor of the 
amount of wealth they possess. That is not to deny the effect of other factors or the 
reciprocal relationship between an actor’s position in the system and wealth. The central 
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mission of this study, however, is to explore what factors determine one’s position within 
the system in the first place and hence shape one’s behavior toward others’ demands for 
power-sharing. 
As actors in upper and lower classes strive to strengthen their position in the 
system, lower class mobilization in the political system exacerbates uneven and 
unbalanced power relations between ruling elite and groups asking for political and 
economic rights. This might result in either inclusion of new groups into the political 
system or the repression of the new groups’ demands by the ruling elite. During the 
course of these interactions, unless lower classes overthrow the elites, what the existing 
elite decides to do is more consequential than the actions of lower classes due to power 
disparities between them and the lower classes. Given that revolutions are rare, 
interactions between these groups are more likely to take the form of either repression or 
concessions. The following questions then arise: What shapes the outcome of such a 
struggle for power? What shapes the ruling-elite behavior? Why do some ruling elites 
respond to public demands with concessions while others respond with repression? 
Perhaps the most common criterion used to evaluate the degree of inclusiveness in 
a political structure is the size of the governing coalition.4 The decision to expand the 
size of the governing coalition, however, is subject to the nature and the source of acto
wealth. The state, as the most powerful organization in a society and as a coveted source 
of wealth and power, represents power distribution in a society and is more likely to best 
rs’ 
                                                 
4 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), for instance, argue that democracies relative to autocracies have larger 
“selectorates” from which members of “winning coalition” are selected.   
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serve the elites’ interests.5 Groups or individuals who are in control of the state apparatus 
receive higher shares of goods produced by the system. The more actors benefit from the 
system, the less likely they will ask for a change, and the more likely they will adopt 
repressive measures, if necessary, to secure their interests. Those who do not have access 
to resources controlled by the political system are likely to fight to become a part of the 
small coalition that controls the resources. The gainers in this system are not likely to 
accept the inclusion of lower classes if such inclusion threatens their interests (i.e., 
reduces the amount of the goods they receive). This indicates that the lesser the threat 
posed from lower classes as they gain leverage, the more the upper classes will be willing 
to accept their inclusion into the decision-making process.6  
Expansion of the governing coalition is likely to be a threatening movement if the 
wealth of the coalition members is primarily derived from resources that by their nature 
cannot be easily divided and shared. Figure 1 shows how expansion might reduce the 
amount of goods available to the elites if the previously disfranchised segments of the 
society are included in the governing coalition. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The state in this study is not treated as an entity insulated from its environment. Statists (e.g., Skocpol 
1979) have argued that state should be treated as an autonomous actor while others (e.g., Geddes 1994) 
argue that state should not be treated autonomous from contending social forces. For a detailed discussion 
on this, see Geddes (1994, 1-19).     
6 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 126) point to a similar argument to explain why some countries adopt 
new technology whereas others do not. They contend that “groups whose political power (not economic 
rents) is eroded,” with the introduction of new technology (e.g., railroads), “will block technological 
advances.” As such, they propose a “political-loser hypothesis,” as an alternative to “economic-loser 
hypothesis,” which contends that powerful actors “block the introduction of new technologies in order to 
protect their economic rents.” Whether one agrees with the “political-loser” or “economic-loser” 
hypothesis, the importance of powerful groups stands out. Besides, as mentioned earlier, in this study, I 
adopt a definition of upper classes that combines economically and politically important actors. 
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Figure 2-1. Governing coalition size and members’ share of wealth.* 
High
Low






*Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 335). 
 
Expanding the governing coalition (moving from A to B) should be unlikely in 
political structures where a substantial reduction in the welfare of ruling elites is at stake. 
The pressure from below to expand the coalition size, in this case, is more likely to end 
up with repression because of the uneven balance of power between governing elite and 
lower classes. On the other hand, if interests of the members of the coalition are not 
mutually exclusive with the inclusion of new members, expansion will become more 
likely (e.g., the expansion will not necessarily threaten the interests of commercial and 
industrial elite because the demands from lower classes are not likely to be zero-sum).  
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Nature of Wealth and Regime Formation 
Figure 1 depicts a polity where the amount of each member’s wealth is mainly a 
factor of the size of the polity. The larger the coalition size, the less each member’s share 
of wealth will be. The nature of wealth, on the other hand, determines the size of the 
governing coalition. Where a society possesses non-divisible resources (such as land), the 
number of actors who can benefit from these resources will be small. Unless the 
population is small and resources are abundant, those who are in control of them will not 
be willing to share, and those who do not have access to them will fight for control. Due 
to power differentials between classes, upper classes are likely to adopt authoritarian 
institutions and use repressive measures to quell lower classes’ demands for voice in the 
system and a share of resource wealth. Countries with a small population and abundant 
resources are not as conflict prone as countries with large populations. Yet they still are 
likely to develop authoritarian regimes because upper classes will not be willing to give 
up their privileged positions within the system. If the amount of pressure from below 
reaches a point where it starts to pose a viable threat to a ruling elite that controls 
abundant resource wealth (e.g., oil states) and presides over a relatively a small-
population, the elite might adopt a strategy of co-optation and use some of their revenues 
to buy off lower classes’ support for the system. Such polities are likely to develop an 
implicit social contract by which lower classes give up political rights in return for 
material benefits. 
The nature of a nation’s wealth provides incentives to those who are in control to 
keep lower classes out of the governing coalition in order to secure their present and 
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future interests and the payoffs they receive from the system. Because expanding the 
coalition size, as shown in Figure 1, necessarily results in smaller shares for the upper 
classes, they will try to secure a constant share at the very least. Concession from ruling 
elites is not a feasible option since it might lead to loss of position in the system or 
replacement by others. 
In reality, the relationship between the horizontal and vertical axes is far from 
being as linear as depicted in Figure 1. Most societies will fall somewhere in between A 
and B. The model presented here, however, is heuristic and intended to provide a better 
understanding of how the nature of wealth influences interactions among the contending 
social forces and regime formation. Nonetheless, the degree of regime inclusiveness is 
mainly a function of the degree of linearity between the x and y axes. That is, the more 
negatively linear this relationship, the higher the level of threat perceived by the 
governing coalition, and thus the more exclusive it will become (and vice versa). 
Nature of Wealth and Regime Formation: Social and Political Consequences 
A non-divisible income source lies at the foundation of authoritarian regimes 
because it provides incentives to those in the governing coalition to exclude lower classes 
from having a say in the system. Lower classes’ demands for a more inclusive regime 
threaten existing elites’ vested interests and reduce the amount of goods and services 
those elites receive. Thus, upward mobility within such a structure, where a substantial 
portion of revenue flows from assets that cannot easily be shared among the members of 
a society, will be obstructed, since it can only come at the expense of the entrenched 
power of the upper classes (see, for instance, Boix 2003, 140, 141). Social mobility, 
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however, is essential for those who strive for better positions in a system and “fosters 
democracy by easing social conflict” (ibid.). 
The absence channels for upward social mobility intensifies the type and level of 
conflict between elites and non-elites. Members of the bourgeoisie (i.e., financiers, 
lawyers, doctors, merchants, manufacturers) became a revolutionary force in the late 
eighteenth century’s France, following the closure of the upward mobility channels 
(Barber 1955). As Barber has observed, this new social class throughout centuries had 
sought the acceptance of the nobility. As she put it (1955, 106, emphasis added) “the 
bourgeoisie not only bargained for economic privileges – in the form, for example, of 
town and guild charters – but it also acquired the support of the monarchy against old 
nobility in its quest for noble status and the noble way of life.” As the power of the 
monarchy declined in the mid-eighteenth century the fight between the old nobility and 
the newly emerging bourgeoisie became apparent and intensified: Several restrictions 
were put in place against bourgeoisie’s quest for nobility. Barber concludes that with the 
reduction of the channels for upward mobility in the eighteenth century France, 
bourgeoisie felt isolated and began to question the moral foundations of the regime. 
The nature of wealth can have substantial effects on regime formation through 
either hindering or facilitating upward mobility for members of a society. Societies that 
possess substantial amounts of wealth that cannot be easily divided or reproduced (e.g., 
land based wealth) are more likely to have a small group that controls those resources. 
The remaining segments of the society strive to get as close to those in control (elite 
group) in order to receive a larger share of the benefits of the country’s wealth. The 
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middle class, groups that fall between the top and bottom of the social ladder in these 
societies, will be either absent or weak. A small and weak middle class is more likely to 
be co-opted by the upper classes and cannot produce a viable challenge to the existing 
political structure because of high levels of dependency on the upper classes. Such 
hierarchical socioeconomic structure is depicted in Figure 2-2. 










The line between the elites and lower classes indicates the rigidity of social mobility between these groups. 
The demand for upward mobility is the dominant move, as represented by the thick arrow, while downward 
mobility for the members of the governing coalition, though possible, is rare. The odds of both actions are 
very low. 
 
Social mobility in such polities is likely to be severely limited and confined to one 
direction; that is, the members of a governing coalition are not likely to be replaced by 
individuals from lower classes. Centralization of power at the apex of the social order 
results in a hierarchical structure with little or no prospects of a substantial political 
change since the likelihood of defenders of the status quo using any means to preserve 
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and protect their vested interests is extremely high. Political change, if it takes place, 
however, is more likely to be of violent nature due to the high stakes and zero-sum 
character of fixed wealth. Replacing upper classes, in such a structure, does not 
necessarily result in a larger coalition in which a substantial portion of the society has a 
say. Groups that overthrow the ruling elite will adopt similar policies to secure their own 
position within the new system. Change in the leadership in such a socioeconomic 
structure does not lead to a change in the fundamentals of the power structure or regime 
type. The Cuban revolution of 1959, for instance, decimated the old nobility, the landed 
gentry, yet the state and the new political leadership, consequently, replaced the landlords 
with no substantial changes in the foundations of the regime. 
Societies where upper classes’ income source is not extensively based upon non-
divisible resources and upward mobility by lower classes does not necessarily threaten 
ruling elites’ interests are more likely to develop a less hierarchical socioeconomic 
structure in which more opportunities for social mobility are available and the direction 
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The dashed line indicates a flexible social mobility between upper and lower levels of the social ladder. 
Arrows indicate possible directions of social mobility. 
 
In contrast to high levels of dependency between upper and lower classes in general and 
between upper and middle classes in particular, low levels of dependency in a less 
hierarchical structure provides not only more opportunities for the lower classes but also 
provides the basis for challenging the political structure and allowing the lower classes to 
become more influential in the decision-making process. More importantly, due to 
relatively lower levels of threat, ruling elites in such societies are more likely to be 
divided, thus indirectly strengthening the non-elites’ hands and laying the ground for 
political change. Despite the fact that the incorporation of the lower classes’ demands 
may raise some concerns among some of the members of the ruling-elite, a large number 
of the elites will not be directly threatened by the accommodation of the lower classes’ 
demands. Therefore it is less likely to observe a unified governing coalition that will 
oppose the non-elites’ demands for a voice in the system. Contrary to high degree of 
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solidarity among those who occupy the upper levels of a socioeconomic ladder in a 
hierarchical structure (e.g., an agrarian socioeconomic structure) to oppose demands from 
below at any cost, elites in an industrialized society may not necessarily agree on the 
exclusion of the lower classes at any cost because of the low level of threat posed to their 
position in the system. Actors from both upper and lower classes in such structures (e.g., 
an industrial society) are more likely to become preoccupied with their private concerns 
and interests, which does not necessarily threaten other actors’ share; hence a more 
tolerant attitude toward other actors’ position in the system prevails. 
Ruling elites, those at the top of the social ladder, have strong incentives to be 
agents of stagnation, resisting demands from below if they perceive such demands as 
threatening to their position in the system. The incorporation of disfranchised groups into 
the system is facilitated if they gain power through means that do not directly and 
necessarily pose a threat to the elites’ interests. Factors that empower lower classes 
without threatening the elites thus facilitate the decision to incorporate the disfranchised 
segments of a society. 
Economic Development, Social Mobility, and Democratization 
I have depicted two distinct forms of social structures from which different 
regimes emerge. However, no social structure is static. Every society and structure 
evolves over time. The crucial question is how to transform a social structure, from one 
in which lower classes’ upward mobility is perceived as a threat by those already in the 
power center into a social structure where upward mobility is not confined to one 
direction or necessarily threatening to the position of elites in the system. As such, the 
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empowerment of the non-elites without posing a direct threat to the elite interests and/or 
the transformation of elite interests is the pivotal factor that determines the outcome of 
emerging political, economic, and/or social crisis within a social structure. Below I 
outline circumstances under which enrichment ameliorates (or worsens) the conflict 
between the rich and poor and lays groundwork for wider participation. 
Industrial Economy and Power-Sharing 
Despite the contending arguments over the validity of the economic development-
democracy hypothesis (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000) it 
“has been tested most thoroughly” (Vanhanen 1997, 21). As Lipset (1959, 75) writes;  
“perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of 
society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development.” The 
basic assumption of this hypothesis is that countries with higher levels of wealth, literacy, 
urbanization, and industrialization are more likely to establish stable, effective, and 
legitimate democratic regimes. Lipset (1959, 83) continues 
 
Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of 
democracy by changing the social conditions of the workers, but it also 
affects the political role of middle class through changing the shape of the 
stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a 
large lower class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class. 
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Nonetheless, the assumption that increased wealth will lead to a social 
stratification from which a middle class will emerge and push for wider participation is 
likely to be conditioned by income source. That is, unless an increase in wealth 
distributes power among the members of a society without threatening ruling elite’s 
entrenched interests within the system, it will not necessarily produce a democratic 
regime. The assumed relationship between wealth and democracy, then, is contingent 
upon the nature of wealth that brings about economic development. An enrichment that 
lays the groundwork for economic transformation, from which new social forces arise 
without posing direct threat to the elite’s interests, is most likely to result in wider 
participation.  
The British transformation exemplifies such a shift. Scholars disagree over when 
and how the struggle for power sharing in Britain culminated in a democratic regime. 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, 96) further point to the peculiarity of transition to democracy 
in Britain since “in no other case did middle-class-based (and largely upper-class-led) 
parties unilaterally extend effective suffrage to substantial sections of the working 
class….” If the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 are the turning points in the British 
transition to democracy (see, for instance, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Collier 1999), one 
should look to events that preceded these acts to explain what factors led to such change. 
The origins of British democratization can be traced back to “the first politico-
constitutional struggle in English history” between the elites in the thirteenth century that 
culminated in some limitations (Magna Carta) on royal power (Stearns 2001, 195). 
Despite the fact that it provided the basis for power sharing “it did not aim to destroy the 
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monarchy or the royal administration” (ibid.). On the contrary, the elites responded 
harshly to the drastic redistributive demands of the Diggers, a group who called for 
wasteland to be given to the poor and began cultivating St. George’s hill in 1649 (Stearns 
2001, 319). Elites responded by destroying Diggers’ houses, animals, and crops, and 
forcing them to abandon the Hills in August 1649.7  
The incorporation of the lower classes’ demands occurred gradually and followed 
the economic and social changes. As Stearns (2001, 313) reports, during the 1648-1814 
period England underwent substantial economic and social changes. On the elite level, 
the agricultural revolution began in the late seventeenth century, “characterized by 
changes in farming technique…increased productivity without a corresponding increase 
in the labor needed to produce food.” Further, the enclosure movement changed the 
landscape of rural England and primarily benefited the upper classes. However, as rural 
England began to flee to the urban areas, as a consequence of changes taking place at the 
upper levels of the social order, lower-level emerging merchants bypassed the regulations 
of guilds by providing the necessary tools (e.g., loom and thread) to poor families with 
little or no land (Stearns 2001). This laid the groundwork for further incorporation of the 
lower classes into the economy, a process Stearns (2001, 313) called 
“protoindustrialization.” The displaced people did not become a disruptive force in the 
                                                 
7 http://www.diggerstrail.co.uk/st_georges_hill.cfm, accessed on March 21, 2006. 
The group claimed the land on the grounds that the English Civil Wars were fought against the King and 
landed elites. However, their activities resulted in local landed elites’ and government’s hostility that led to 
the dispersion of their colony within less than a year (http://diggers.org/english_diggers.htm#Digger, 
accessed on Feb. 19, 2007).    
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process mainly because they were absorbed into the transforming economy.8 These 
changes culminated in the Industrial Revolution, which further helped lower classes 
become incorporated into the economic and political system. 
The Great Reform Bill of 1832 “helped to shift the balance of power in the 
Commons to the industrial and commercial elite…but it failed to destroy the traditional 
elite’s power within the system” (Stearns 2001, 446, emphasis added). That is, the new 
powerful groups’ gaining leverage within the political system did not directly challenge 
the traditional elites’ power within the socioeconomic structure. Despite the fact that the 
Bill was a cornerstone in the process of democratization, it did not “eliminate the 
possibility of influence [from the Lords] because it did not provide the secret ballot…nor 
did it provide the working classes, who had rallied for extension of the franchise, with the 
vote” (ibid.). These events eventually led to the second (1867) and the third (1884) 
Reform Bills, which “extended the vote to adult male householders in the counties thus 
increased the franchise to include approximately four-fifth of the entire male population” 
(ibid., 488). 
The transformation that took place during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
changed the shape of the British society and led to the incorporation of the lower classes. 
The crux here is that the empowerment of the masses did not come about at the expense 
of the upper classes. On the contrary, as Moore (1966, 3) has observed, the landed upper 
class in Britain played a very important role in the transformation to an industrial 
                                                 
8 Besides economic transformation that absorbed a large number of new urban settlers a significant number 
of the population migrated to the new world, mostly North America. The availability of migration further 
eased the pressure on the evolving socioeconomic structure.     
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economy. As “capitalist influences penetrated and transformed much of the countryside,” 
the landed gentry “absorbed new elements [bourgeoisie] into their ranks…”(1966, 19, 
39).9 In a way, the old hierarchical British social socioeconomic structure evolved into a 
less hierarchical structure in which the established elites remained powerful with more 
opportunities for the lower classes’ quest for upward social mobility. This transformation 
is depicted in Figure 4. 






As the British transformation shows, as long as economic development empowers 
the poor without replacing the rich (i.e., as a socioeconomic structure gradually evolves 
from a “elongated pyramid” into a “diamond,” using Lipset’s (1959, 83) words) it 
increases the chances for wider participation. As Linz and Stepan (1996, 78) have noted, 
elite should believe that “they could manage equally well” in a more democratic 
environment for a transition to occur. 
As a socioeconomic structure evolves into a “diamond” the conflict between 
upper and lower classes ceases to be over ownership. As a result, the political elite 
                                                 
9 Notice, this is contrary to what happened in France in eighteenth century. The French nobility and/or 
landed elite did not undergo a transformation which could absorb the emerging class, bourgeoisie. Rather, 
they attempted to restrict the bourgeoisie’s quest for upward social mobility (see, Barber 1955).    
 32
becomes more lenient toward lower classes’ demands for better life standards mainly to 
prevent “widespread social unrest and revolution” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000b, 
1167) by which the elite could lose more than a possible redistribution through, say, 
higher wages (also see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006b). As the lower classes’ demands 
intensify, the upper classes are likely to agree on ameliorative measures to quell demands 
from below. The demands for a share of the powerful elite’s wealth may be solved 
through provision of more material benefits to those asking for more. This, however, is a 
matter of distribution, which can be addressed in several ways: Higher taxes on the 
owners of the assets, higher wages to the labor, or better health conditions through 
providing health insurance. 
Such transformation not only improves human capital but also is more likely to 
contribute to the growth of a relatively independent middle class that can provide the 
basis of checks and balances within the system. It can provide alternative ways of 
achieving a higher rank on the social ladder and disperse power without posing a threat to 
the elite’s position in the structure. Therefore, what lies behind the emergence of a 
democratic system is not increased wealth per se but rather the transformation of elites’ 
and/or non-elites’ interests. As the socioeconomic transformation provides more space 
for the members of society (i.e., as the type of wealth of the members of a society, but 
especially of the elites, changes from land to industrial capital) and hence reduces the 
level and the type of threat associated with demands from the excluded segments of a 
society, the likelihood of transition to a higher level of participation rises.  
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Hypothesis 2-1: An industrial economy increases the chances for wider participation by 
facilitating upward social mobility through providing alternative paths to power. 
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Agrarian Economy and Power-Sharing 
Societies where agricultural land is the primary income source are most likely to 
produce a rigid hierarchical structure from which an authoritarian system of governance 
emerges. Such structure resembles a triangle, or “elongated pyramid” (Lipset 1959, 83), 
in which power is concentrated at the top of the social order and the main route to power 
is confined to an upward direction (see Figure 2). 
Land as the primary income source makes conflict between parties intractable 
(Paige 1975).10 This is partially because the income source, land, is “immobile” and 
cannot be transferred abroad (Boix 2003). Nonetheless, the most notable link between an 
authoritarian regime and an agrarian economy is the fact that the landed elite is 
“unwilling and unable to grant any political and economic concessions and dependent on 
legal or extralegal force for its economic survival” (Paige 1975, 58). An agricultural 
economy is less likely to produce enough revenues for all members of a society. The 
pressure from below in such social and economic structure, as Boix has observed (2003), 
might lead to political violence and most probably to repression due to the uneven 
balance of power between the rich and poor. 
The key behind accommodation and incorporation of the lower classes’ demands 
in such a structure is elite transformation. Transformation of the elites in a 
commercialized agrarian structure from owners to intermediaries (in other words to 
                                                 
10 Although Paige’s main goal is to explain under what circumstances an agrarian revolution comes about, 
his central argument, however, can help better explain how different income sources encourage different 
types of political behavior. Paige (1975, 58) argues that conflict between “cultivators” [farmers] and 
“noncultivators” [landed elite] is most likely to produce a revolution when the former group derives its 
income from wages while the latter’s income comes from land.  
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operators, processors, financiers, and exporters (Paige 1997)) widens the upper level of 
the triangle, resulting in a pentagon-like structure as depicted in Figure 2-5. 








The transformed structure will have relatively more space for the lower classes, 
and more importantly, because of the expansion in the upper level of the structure, the 
degree and nature of the threat from below will be reduced and altered. 
The variation in elites’ responses after the 1929 depression in El Salvador and 
Costa Rica, for instance, was mainly a factor of the elite’s income source, from which 
repression and accommodation/incorporation came about, respectively (see, for instance, 
Paige 1997; Yashar 1997). It is worthwhile to note that in 1929 bananas and coffee were 
still responsible for more than 90 percent of total exports in both Costa Rica (92.4 %) and 
El Salvador (92.6 %)  (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 34). Hence, the incorporation of the lower 
classes into the system in Costa Rica cannot exactly be tied to the differences in 
economic structures of Costa Rica and El Salvador: Agriculture was the dominant income 
source in both countries. The Costa Rican elites, however, contrary to their counterparts 
in El Salvador, “deprived of complete control over production…emerged as an elite of 
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processors and exporters rather than growers” (Paige 1997, 81). Despite relatively a large 
number of small holders in Costa Rica, as Paige has put it (ibid.), they were “under the 
unrestricted control of the coffee-processing elite…” thereby “lacked both the capital and 
technological knowledge” to challenge the power of the upper classes. 
The responses from Salvadoran elites in 1930s and 1980s to lower classes’ 
demands perhaps provide even stronger evidence of the vitality of elites’ role for a 
change toward wider participation to occur. As Paige (1997) has argued the elites in El 
Salvador in the 1930s did not hesitate to use repression against the lower classes’ 
demands. The roots of such repressive measures and intractable conflict is to be found in 
two equally important factors: The elites derived a large portion of their wealth from the 
land, on the one hand, and the masses, influenced by the Communist ideals, demanded “a 
fundamental redistribution of wealth and power,” on the other (Paige 1997, 100). The 
insurrection of 1932 was harshly repressed and the emerging political and economic 
structure endured until the civil war of the 1980s (Paige 1997). 
Over the years, however, El Salvador went through a substantial economic 
restructuring. By 1954 the traditional exports (coffee and bananas) still made up nearly 
90 percent of total foreign exchange earnings (Bulmer-Thomas 1987). However from the 
mid-1950s the value of coffee exports started to decline: It dropped from $92 million in 
1954 to $72.6 million in 1960. In the same period the value of cotton exports increased 
from $6.5 millions to $15.8 millions (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 155). The net output for 
cotton reached $33.5 millions in 1970 (ibid., 187). The introduction of new crops other 
than coffee (e.g., cotton, sugar), technological advancements, and change in the 
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international political and economic context facilitated the incorporation of the lower 
classes’ demands by shifting elite interests and reducing the profit margin of the old 
political economy (see, for instance, Paige 1997; Robinson 2003). 
Having said that, however, the governing coalition is not monolithic and some 
members will have better chances and skills to benefits from a possible transformation. 
Although some members of the governing coalition will be left out through such 
evolution, the process of change toward democracy will be dominated and primarily 
shaped by the elites’ interests. In such a pentagon-like structure, what elites do is still 
more consequential. However, because of the transformation of the elites’ interests, the 
type and level of the threat posed by the non-elites will be low, facilitating an 
accommodation process. 
Hypothesis 2-2: An agrarian economy impedes wider participation. 
Mineral Economy and Power-Sharing 
Scholars have often referred to the inimical effects of mineral wealth on 
democratization. Building upon the rentier state framework that was first introduced by 
Mahdavy (1970) and later refined by others (e.g., Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Luciani 
1987; Ross 1999; 2001) to refer to the debilitating consequences of external rents, 
political scientists have argued that natural resource wealth, especially abundant oil 
revenues, stagnates economic development and hinders democratization. The central 
point in these studies is that the availability of large external rents, accrued directly to the 
state, severs the political authority from the society and dampens the popular demands for 
participation. 
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Natural-resource abundance the proponents of the rentier state framework argue 
influences the level of democracy by providing positive and negative incentives for the 
state and society alike. Governing elites with large amounts of revenues at their discretion 
can buy political support and relieve social pressures for reform by providing society 
with abundant material benefits such as low tax rates and extensive social welfare 
benefits. Likewise, surplus revenues enable the state to maintain the coercive capacity to 
repress any demands for democratic reforms and popular participation (Ross 2001). The 
availability of revenues, not generated domestically, precludes the need to seek political 
legitimacy through participation and lessens the reliance of rulers on the active support of 
their populations (Anderson 1987; Luciani 1987; 2005). It also brings about distributional 
issues and causes a heightened sense of fear among the ruling elite (Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2004), thereby detaching the governing elites from their population. 
In addition to the political consequences of abundant natural resources, this logic 
further suggests that natural resource abundance can produce economic stagnation 
through the effect known as the Dutch Disease. This effect involves the appreciation of a 
state’s real exchange currency, a sharp rise in imports, and a decline in the production 
and export of agricultural and manufactured products, mainly due to heavy government 
spending (Corden and Neary 1982; Ross 1999; Stevens 2003). As such, the income 
source influences, if not determines, basic rules of the political game (Luciani 1987). 
However, despite a large body of empirical work that has established a negative 
relationship between natural resource wealth and poor economic and political 
performance, the results are subject to criticism and very sensitive to the period chosen 
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(Stevens 2003). Although studies have found that resource-rich economies have 
underperformed on political but especially economic performance when compared with 
the resource-poor economies, this is not true for the period before the 1970s (Auty 2001, 
3). On the contrary, resource-abundant countries of West European offshoots, such as 
USA, Canada, South Africa, and of Latin America grew at a faster rate than resource-
poor countries at the end of nineteenth century (Auty 2001, 4, also see Findlay and 
Lundhal 2001). The point of departure is that primary commodity exports (i.e., natural 
resources) provide foreign exchange that can stimulate or generate other sectors. The 
mining economy in South Africa in the late nineteenth century, Findlay and Lundhal 
(2001, 102) argue, “required a railroad network to exploit [the mining fields]…[and] road 
construction to provide food supplies to the mining regions.” They continue, 
“manufacturing production was also stimulated, not only by demand but also by the 
supplies of technical skills and entrepreneurial experience in the mining sector.” 
The evidence from fuel-rich countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, Venezuela, 
Norway) and non-fuel resource-rich (e.g., Chile, Botswana) countries alike casts doubt on 
the prevalent view on the link between natural resource-abundance and authoritarianism. 
The discovery of oil in 1918 in Venezuela generated massive new income flows that 
stimulated the emergence of new commercial, industrial, and professional groups. Soon 
the economic power of these new social actors surpassed that of the traditional 
(agricultural) oligarchy (Yashar 1997; Stearns 2001), a group that has been associated 
with authoritarian regimes (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Boix 2003), in the 
following decades. Malaysia has managed to avoid economic and political crises 
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associated with resource-abundance through reducing fiscal expenditures and 
encouraging the private sector growth (Abidin 2001, 162). As a result, it “has very 
successfully changed from an essentially rentier state to a diversified economy with a 
strong private sector” (Luciani 2005a, 159). Likewise, Indonesia, as Rosser (2004) has 
observed, has managed to overcome the resource curse and convert the oil revenues into 
other forms of capital. Rosser (2004, 17) reports that during the oil boom periods 
Indonesia was able to use its oil wealth for developmental purposes, including “spending 
on agricultural development (particularly fertilizer and subsidies for rice production) and 
education….” 
The social and political structure in a society with abundant high-profit-yielding, 
land-based-resources, such as oil and minerals, will differ from the structure in a 
commercialized agrarian society. A mineral economy, relative to an agrarian economy, is 
more likely to lay the groundwork for a wider participation through two main 
mechanisms. 
First, abundant mineral wealth often provides more revenues than an agrarian 
economy and these can be used to sponsor industrialization. Such state-sponsored 
industrialization can lead to a developmental paradox from which social forces arise and 
put limits on the state’s power (Bellin 2002). In Bellin’s (2002, 4) words “by sponsoring 
industrialization, the state nurtures the development of social forces ultimately capable of 
amassing sufficient power to challenge it and impose a measure of policy responsiveness 
upon it.” Bellin further points to the second paradox that emerges as a function of the 
state-sponsored industrialization. The process that generates new social actors limits 
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these actors’ commitment to democratization since they are the primary beneficiaries of 
the system. The dependency between these actors and the state serves as an obstacle for a 
substantial change in the system and results in a democratic regime “stunted halfway 
between autocracy and fully accountable government” (ibid.). This, however, is neither a 
permanent nor a stable equilibrium and the conditions under which democratization is 
“stalled” might come to an end. At times when an authoritarian government is confronted 
with a crisis of power, groups or individuals empowered by the state-sponsored 
developmental policies will make demands for a say in the decision-making process.  
In a similar vein Okruhlik (1999, 297) draws attention to the social consequences 
of oil revenues. She points to two important mechanisms through which spending oil 
monies can lead to the rise of social dissent rather than to “placate” it. Okruhlik makes an 
important point by pointing to the political aspect of oil revenues. Abundant oil revenues 
provide the state with an important tool to legitimize its existence through huge public 
spending. However, it also brings about distributional issues along with an opposition 
strengthened and mobilized as a result of such public policy. That is “the state engenders 
its own opposition” (ibid., emphasis added).   
Second, large oil revenues can facilitate democratization when some of the oil 
revenues are invested in the development of human capital. Oil-rich countries that do not 
have ambitious industrialization programs, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, have used 
their oil wealth not only to build infrastructure but also to eradicate illiteracy and improve 
health care. Birdsall et al.’s (2001) comparative analysis of South Korea (an export-
oriented resource-poor country) and Brazil (a country with an inward-looking 
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development strategy and abundant natural resources)11 conclude that a resource-poor-
export-oriented economic structure increases the demand for skilled workers and, hence 
investments in education should be greater than in resource-abundant economies. It 
should be noted, however, that the authors also point to the possibility of using revenues 
raised from resources to improve human capital, as the case of Indonesia illustrates, 
(2001, 72-73). One problem associated with this analysis is that it does not take into 
account the initial conditions for each country. The authors (2001, 72), for instance, state 
“…even in the early 1970s when Brazilian economy was booming…Korean’s enrollment 
rate…was almost double Brazil’s.” The data from the World Development Indicators12 
confirm this conclusion yet also reveal some important information. 
                                                 
11 Brazil does not have substantial oil revenues. The authors primarily refer to abundant lands as natural 
resources. However, their point is that natural resource abundance, generally, undermines the demand for 
skilled workers. 
12World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM.  
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Table 2-1. Abundant oil revenues and education.   
Country Name Oil-Rich* % Illiterate (1970) % Illiterate (2001) Change 
Oman Yes 81.46 26.98 54.48 
Algeria Yes 78.48 32.2 46.28 
Bahrain Yes 49.08 12.12 36.96 
Egypt No 68.41 43.88 24.53 
Qatar Yes 41.75 18.34 23.41 
Brazil No 31.6 12.7 18.9 
Bangladesh No 74.97 59.45 15.52 
South Korea No 13.2 2.14 11.06 
*Oil consists of at least one third of total merchandise exports. 
Table 1 presents the illiteracy rate for a handful of countries with diverging 
economic structures. As the last column demonstrates, when the initial conditions are 
taken into account, oil-abundant countries have outperformed oil-poor countries at 
eradicating illiteracy. Obviously the decline in illiteracy rate may not be linear and South 
Korea’s performance is still stunning in terms of percentage change. The difference 
between two similarly situated Muslim countries, Algeria and Egypt, points to an 
important finding, however. Other than being more democratic13 than Egypt, Algeria, as 
an oil-rich country, has been more successful in terms of eradicating illiteracy. Results 
                                                 
13 Here I rely on the Polity democracy scale, which ranges from –10 (least democratic) to +10 (most 




from other countries, such as Bangladesh and Bahrain, strengthen the assumption that oil 
wealth can be turned into human capital. 
As one of the leading Middle East studies experts, Giacomo Luciani (2005a, 149), 
observes, states that have been identified as rentier therefore with little or no prospects 
for democratization “such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and even Saudi Arabia have 
been moving toward wider political participation, although not full-scale democracy, 
while non-rentier states have resisted such moves”. Luciani (2005a, 150, emphasis added) 
ties these unexpected developments to the strength of the private sectors in these rentier 
states. In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait “the large dimension of the domestic circulation of 
the rent and its long duration have led to the accumulation of immense private fortunes 
by leading individuals and families, and smaller ones by a larger number of medium-
sized and small businesspeople.” Similarly Qatar and Dubai have become regional 
centers for tourism, internet, media, and transportation. None of these would have been 
possible without the oil wealth. In his detailed analysis of the roots of the private sector in 
Saudi Arabia, Luciani (2005b) ties the genesis of business class to large oil rents. 
Although the improvements are still far from being defined as a transition from an 
authoritarian rule to a democratic one, nonetheless, the business class that has emerged as 
a function of decades of oil rents has been pushing for wider participation. Prince Al-
Walid bin Tallal, as one of “the most powerful” and “visible” businessman, “has publicly 
advocated direct election of the Majlis based on universal suffrage. He has also advocated 
women rights, notably the right to drive; and in a coup de theatre in November 2004 he 
hired the first Saudi woman pilot to fly the private planes of Kingdom Holding” (Luciani 
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2005b, 174, 175). It is worthwhile to note that Saudi Arabia, despite some improvements 
toward greater participation, has not experienced any positive change on the Polity scale 
(the measure of democracy used in this study). Therefore, the direction of any potential 
bias that might ensue is downward: Taking into account improvements, albeit minor, in a 
country like Saudi Arabia, would have provided further evidence to the argument 
proposed here.14 Therefore as Okruhlik (1999, 297) has aptly put it “the rentier 
framework has proven inadequate in elucidating the rise of dissent because it reifies the 
state and overemphasizes state resources and autonomy from the social consequences of 
expenditures.” 
That does not suggest the governing elites’ commitment to democratic ideals in 
mineral-abundant countries. However, the current emphasis on the nexus between natural 
resources and regime formation needs to be dissected and clarified. Natural resources 
(i.e., minerals and agriculture) can have different effects on the decision to open up the 
political system through incorporating lower class demands. Mineral resources can 
provide larger revenues for the members of a social order, but especially for those occupy 
the upper echelons of the ladder, to incorporate the lower classes demands for power 
sharing. More importantly, mineral wealth can provide alternative paths to upward 
mobility through translating abundant mineral wealth into other forms of capital. A 
mineral economy, more so than an agrarian economy, can therefore transform the 
socioeconomic structure through building industry and investing in human capital. This 
discussion leads to two contending hypotheses.  
                                                 
14 For another excellent detailed discussion on oil revenues and the rise of dissent for wider participation in 
Saudi Arabia, see, Okruhlik (1999). 
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Hypothesis 2-3a: A mineral economy impedes wider participation because the demands 
for participation threaten elites’ interests. 
Hypothesis 2-3b: A mineral economy facilitates wider participation through providing 
large revenues to sponsor industrialization and improve human capital. 
Although the transformation of elites and/or non-elites lies behind wider 
participation, in some instances lower classes might be able to gain some leverage 
without any transformation taking place. The first example of non-elites empowerment is 
social revolutions, where upper classes are toppled through violent means. In most of 
these cases, the traditional elite is decimated during or after the process of takeover and a 
drastic redistribution of the resources among the masses follows. The process is depicted 
in Figure 6a. 







The second example of non-elites gaining power is where a massive amount of 
unclaimed resources become available and distributed among the members of the lower 
classes without endangering elites’ position in the system. Such enrichment or 
empowerment of the lower classes will push the lower segments of the triangle and 
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broaden the space available for the non-elites, yet it is not likely to generate any structural 
changes. This is depicted in Figure 6b. 







Relatively low levels of violence and a less repressive authoritarian regime in 
Honduras during the 1970s and 1980s, in contrast to unprecedented repression observed 
in the neighboring countries, especially in Guatemala and El Salvador, was primarily a 
function of the massive amount of land available to be distributed to meet the rising 
demands from below. The average hectares of arable land per person, for instance, were 
.66 for Honduras in 1961 and .43 in 1979. These values for the same period were .18 and 
.12 for El Salvador and .27 and .19 for Guatemala (World Development Indicators online 
data).15 Further, the so-called Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 
provided a substantial amount of arable land to the Honduran elites to be distributed 
among the members of the lower classes. 
The only scenario in which the old ruling classes are set aside, excluded from the 
new regime, and often decimated is revolutions. However, leaving revolutions aside, 
which can be considered as exceptions to the rule and very rare in the history, democracy 
                                                 
15 Accessed at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ on March 9, 2006.  
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has mainly been a project in which elites sustain their privileged positions. Empowerment 
of the lower classes with no accompanying transformation may or may not lead to open 
polities in which the rule of the executive is checked and balanced by other institutions 
within the society. Although the theory proposed in this study suggests otherwise unique 
circumstances may create conditions that lead to wider participation. 
A cursory analysis of the modern revolutions reveals no clear pattern, however. 
Of the revolutions that brought about some degree of participation (e.g., France 1789, 
Nicaragua 1979, and Iran 1979) the French revolution was perhaps the most revealing in 
terms of bringing about a substantially wider participation. It is worth remembering, 
however, that despite the fact that the French revolution weakened the established elites’ 
position in the system, it did not annihilate the old elites’ power bases. Besides, the lower 
classes had undergone a substantial social and economic change before the revolution 
took place. The exclusion of the established elites from the new regime, however, played 
a important role in generating ups and down in the French democratization process and 
led to instability in the following decades (Lipset 1960). Russian and Chinese revolutions 
of 1917 and 1949, respectively, however led to the opposite results.  
To summarize, the type of enrichment and/or economic development and the 
nature of wealth can have substantial influences on the chances that a country will make a 
transition to more participatory governance. I concur with the proponents of 
modernization theory that economic development leads to the emergence of democratic 
regimes. However, the theory proposed in this study suggests a rather different casual 
mechanism. Modernization theory does not explicitly state the role of widely distributed 
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resources on democratization. However, implicit in the hypothesis is the proposition that 
economic development functions as an equalizing force by shifting the shape of social 
structure from a “an elongated pyramid, with a large lower class base, to a diamond with 
a growing middle class” (Lipset 1959, 83). 
Vanhanen (1997, 24) makes this relationship very clear in stating 
“…democratization takes place under conditions in which power resources have become 
so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to 
maintain its hegemony.” Putting aside the elegant proposition laid out in Boix’s (2003) 
Democracy and Redistribution regarding the link between the asset specificity and 
regime type, economic equality occupies the cornerstone in Boix’s theory. Economic 
equality, Boix asserts (2003, 3), not only facilitates a peaceful transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic system of governance, characterized by universal 
suffrage, but also helps sustain a democratic regime. 
The theory proposed here, however, sheds more light on the dynamic of the 
change toward wider participation by emphasizing the importance of economic 
transformation, social mobility, and the vitality of elites’ role in such a change.16 As 
such, economic equality ceases to be a significant factor in the process and democracy 
turns into an elite project (Burton et al. 1992; Collier 1999; Higley and Burton 2006). 
                                                 
16 As noted earlier, although Boix (2003) points to the importance of social mobility, the emphasize is on 
economic inequality and how it interacts with “asset specificity.” The central conclusion that he reaches 
therefore is economic equality not only fosters transition to a democratic regime but also helps sustain it. 
Hence, despite a similarity at first glance between the theory proposed here and Boix’s theory of 
democratization, due mainly to the role of social mobility in both theories, my work challenges his main 
finding. In other words, equality ceases to be a significant factor in democratization and higher levels of 
economic inequality rather help to sustain a democratic regime by providing strong incentives to the elites 
to abide by the rules of the game.     
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The gap between the upper and lower classes becomes a necessary element for a 
transition to take place since the rich usually have the capacity and willingness to take 
actions necessary to prevent a substantial change in the system of social stratification. 
The symbiosis between the landed-elite and military power in Central America, 
instance, facilitated centralization of the power and blocked any substantial change in 
socioeconomic structure for decades, if not centuries (see, for instanc
for 
the 
e, Karl 1990). 
In addition as the Salvadoran case illustrates despite decades of widespread 
politically motivated violence the ruling elite clung to power and did not hesitate to 
employ unprecedented brutal measures to keep their position in the socioeconomic 
structure intact. The incorporation of the lower classes’ demands came only after the 
elites concluded, “they could manage equally well,” borrowing Linz and Stepan’s (1996, 
78) words, in a more democratic environment. In other words, the introduction of 
electoral democracy served as an exit strategy from an ongoing conflict to a peaceful 
political environment in which the rich were still more likely to win/prevail (see, for 
instance, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000b; Wood 2001; Wantchekon and Neeman 2002; 
Wantchekon 2004). As Robinson avers (2003, 101, emphasis in original) the peace 
accords between the El Salvadoran elites and the FMLN insurgency in the early 1990s 
“preserved the class rule of the Salvadoran elite and left the government, the state’s 
institutionality, the economic system, and the social order intact.” What was negotiated, 
Robinson continues, “were the terms under which the FMLN became integrated into the 
existing social order,” not the system itself. 
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This is not to undermine the role of the pressure from lower classes. No ruling 
elite would voluntarily give up its power just because socioeconomic transformation has 
yielded alternative paths to power. The pressure from the excluded segments of a society 
is certainly an important factor for any change to take place (Anderson 1992; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2000b; 2001). However, this pressure is an intervening factor for several 
reasons. First, the emergence of such pressure itself is likely to be conditioned by 
socioeconomic transformation. Second, such pressure is likely to be triggered by several 
domestic and foreign factors, which can range from the succession crises, economic 
bottlenecks, and changes in the international/regional political and economic context. 
Thus, pressure from lower classes may be generated as a function of some unforeseen 
events, ranging from succession crisis to changes in the international political and 
economic environment, which in turn might lead to post hoc theory development. 
Further, the type and level of pressure from below is hard to measure mainly because not 
all events and/or crises have the same effect on social groups. Pressure from below, 
hence, can at best serve as an intervening variable. 
When such pressure emerges, the crucial factors are those that determine upper 
classes’ behavior toward adopting accommodation or repression. As the case of El 
Salvador suggests, the changes in the domestic economic structure (in other words the 
relative decline in the profit margin of the old economic structure and the transformation 
of established elites from land owner and producers to intermediaries (Paige 1997) 
parallel with changes in the international economic and political context (Robinson 
2003)), broke the tie between the upper and lower classes through introduction of 
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multiparty elections. Therefore, despite long and bloody civil conflict, the transformation 
of ruling-elites’ interests played the key role in bringing about the incorporation of the 
lower classes’ economic and political demands, albeit not fully, into the system. 
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CHAPTER III 
AN ILLUSTRATION: DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN 
I have argued that as long as lower classes’ demands for wider participation in the 
decision-making process pose a threat to the upper classes’ interests, elites will not 
voluntarily open up the system. The key behind an important change toward democracy 
is social and economic transformation that enables upper classes to accommodate lower 
classes’ demands. As the elites’ interests shift as a function of changes in the economic 
structure, the chances for their adopting accommodative rather than repressive response 
strategies to lower class demands increase. In some instances economic transformation 
might lay the groundwork for transition to wider participation by providing alternative 
paths to power for the lower classes. As the members of lower classes find alternative 
ways of climbing the social ladder their demands become less threatening for the elites’ 
vested interests; hence a peaceful transition to wider participation becomes possible. 
Democratization in Taiwan exemplifies such change. Before I provide empirical 
evidence, a brief analysis of Taiwanese democratization might be useful to illustrate the 
relationship between economic transformation, elites, and democratization. 
By ordinary standards Taiwan is a homogeneous society. Nonetheless, there is a 
division between the settlers who reached the island before 1945 and those who came 
after the Communist takeover on the mainland in 1949. The former group began to flee to 
Taiwan mainly from Chinese coastal provinces in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
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centuries.17 The offspring of those who migrated to the island before 1945 are generally 
known as Taiwanese, whereas those who arrived after 1945 are called mainlanders (Pang 
1992).18 The Taiwanese constitute 80-85% of the total population whereas the 
mainlanders make up 15 to 17% of Taiwan’s population (Pang 1992). Despite the fact 
that they both are Han people, the bloody incidents of February 1947 “triggered the 
antagonism of Taiwanese against mainlanders and the Nationalist regime” (Pang 1992, 
42). The conflict “which was sparked by the mismanagement of an unyielding KMT 
governor” hence “left the Taiwanese society fragmented” and “alienated the Taiwanese 
people from the immigrant regime” (Lin 1998, 66). 
In addition to being an immigrant government with no social base, the 
Kuomintang (KMT) feared the possibility of rural insurgency inspired by the land 
reforms going on in PRC (People Republic of China) between 1949 and 1952. 
Consequently the KMT adapted a series of land reforms of its won on Taiwan. The KMT 
government had once prevented land reform on the mainland due to its ties with the 
landed elites. Yet, once on Taiwan, it implemented a large-scale land reform by which 
the already weakened landed elite was eliminated (Pang 1992). The primary reason 
behind these land reforms, however, was political: “The land reform was an effort to 
secure the loyalty of the peasants and to combat the Chinese Communists’ intrigue of 
using the weaknesses of the tenancy structure to instigate agrarian uprisings” (Pang 1992, 
135).  
                                                 
17 http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/p028.html, accessed on 02/07, 2006. 
18 The aborigines (non-Han minorities) make up about only 2% of the total population 
(http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/p028.html accessed on 02/07, 2006; also see Pang 
1992).  
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Lin (1998, 105) reports that “27.0% of the cropland in Taiwan were redistributed 
between 1951 and 1963” and “43.7% of farm families in Taiwan had acquired some land 
as a result of the reform.” Taiwan’s land reform has been very successful by ordinary 
standards (Powelson and Stock 1990). The agricultural output increased and rural support 
for the regime was secured. As a result of the reform the national income share of the 
highest fifth quartile declined from 61.4 percent in 1953 to 41.4 percent in 1964. During 
the same period the share of the poorest 20 percent of households raised from 3.0 percent 
to 7.7 percent and the GINI income coefficients decreased from .558 to .321 (Pang 1992).  
The turning point for the Taiwanese economy, however, came after the KMT 
government adopted export-led industrialization in the mid-1960s. The KMT’s economic 
polices succeeded in transforming Taiwan from an agrarian society to an industrialized 
country within a reasonably short period of time. The following quote from Pang (1992: 
21) succinctly summarizes the remarkable performance of the KMT state in Taiwan.  
 
From 1952 to 1990, her [Taiwan] GNP growth rates averaged 8.8% and 
industry grew 12.0% annually. During the same period, the share of 
industry in employment climbed from 16.9% to 40.9% while the share of 
agriculture decreased from 56.1% to 12.9%. The share of industrial 
production in gross domestic product increased from 19.7 to 42.3%. 
 
Despite equalizing force of the land reforms, the engine of rapid economic growth 
has been the manufacturing sector since the mid-1960s (Pang 1992). As Ho (1978) 
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reports a large share of the increases in employment between 1940 and 1974 was 
absorbed by the manufacturing sector. The share of employment in the manufacturing 
sector doubled between 1966 and 1974 and the percentage of labor force employed in 
agriculture, for the same period, declined from 43 percent to 31.0 percent (Ho 1978, 132). 
Economic Transformation and Regime Change in Taiwan 
The evolution of the KMT regime from an exclusive and highly authoritarian 
polity into a democratic system is worth studying since it can provide valuable 
information about the dynamics of regime change and the effect of economic 
transformation on such change. Most scholars agree that the Taiwanese political system 
underwent a substantial change in the mid-1980s. Lin (1998, 46), for instance, divides 
democratic transition in Taiwan into liberalization and democratization periods. The 
former period started with the formal establishment of the Democratic Progress Party 
(DPP) and the abolition of martial law in 1986. According to Lin, the National Affairs 
Conference held in 1990 marked the transition period and culminated in the first direct 
presidential elections in 1996. Whether one starts the democratic period from the formal 
announcement of the opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party, (DPP) in 1986 or 
from the first direct presidential elections in 1996, this transition cannot be isolated from 
socioeconomic changes undertaken in the past decades. As a matter of fact the 
“remarkably” peaceful transition from the KMT’s authoritarian regime to a democratic 
system can be treated as an outcome of the economic transformation that started in the 
mid-1960s (Matsumoto 2002, 359).  
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As an immigrant government, the KMT rule was primarily based on the 
immigrants that fled to the island after the Chinese Communist party (CCP) took power 
in mainland China in 1949. Pang (1992, 37) reports that during 1949-1950 period more 
than one million refugees, mostly professionals and administrators, moved to the island 
with the KMT. Despite the fact that the islanders had become apolitical after a long 
period of Japanese colonization and their leadership cadre were mostly eliminated during 
the February 28, 1947 incident, the KMT state had to deal with an angry populace that 
composed the majority on the island (Pang 1992). These conditions resulted in a “strong 
sense of insecurity” for the KMT, to use Lin’s (1992, 21) words. 
Therefore, one of the KMT’s main goals was to legitimize its rule and secure rural 
support. As mentioned earlier to this end it undertook land reform soon after its arrival on 
the island. As a result of the land reforms rural support was secured. Nevertheless, 
despite the successful land reforms that distributed the wealth among the member of the 
society more equally (GINI income coefficients, for instance, decreased from .558 to .321 
from 1953 to 1964, see, Pang 1992), the political decision-making process was still 
controlled and dominated by the mainlanders. 
The role of the Taiwanese in the decision-making, however, increased during the 
years of the economic transformation. During this period the Taiwanese were 
incorporated into the system by recruiting them into the KMT’s “highest elite circle” 
(Pang 1992, 67). As a result the regime gradually transformed into a “responsive 
authoritarian” regime over time (Lin 1998, 19). 
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This responsiveness by no means refers to a democratic polity. However, it does 
imply some degree of power sharing with the previously excluded classes. Inclusion and 
participation have been regarded as the essence of democratic polities. More specifically, 
sharing power among the members of a society constitutes a crucial element of 
democracy (see, for instance, Dahl 1998, Vanhanen 1997). This by no means legitimizes 
semi-authoritarian regimes, in which the core principles of a democratic regime (e.g., 
equality, participation, inclusion) are present with certain limitations. The point, however, 
is that not all non-democratic regimes are equally authoritarian. Some elements of a 
democratic system of governance can be found in an authoritarian regime just as some 
elements of authoritarianism can be found in a democratic regime. The question, then, is 
how and under what conditions does an authoritarian regime evolve toward a system in 
which power becomes relatively more widely distributed (i.e., institutionalized) and the 
number of participants in the decision-making process gets larger. 
Toward Power-Sharing and Democratization in Taiwan 
To assess the weight of the Taiwanese in the decision-making process before the 
transition, I look at the KMT’s Central Standing Committee (CSC). Despite the fact that 
elections were held regularly during the authoritarian years, the real power center was the 
leader, Chiang Kai-shek (1948-1975), and the CSC as the “highest elite circle” within the 
party (Pang 1992, 67). It is quite possible that the KMT adopted incorporation of the 
Taiwanese elites primarily to legitimize its rule and gain people’s support. However, no 
matter what the motivation was, incorporation of the Taiwanese elite into the CSC 
indicates an important step taken toward power sharing and wider participation. 
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The size and composition of the KMT’s CSC, hence, can reveal crucial 
information about the distribution of power between the two main groups, mainlanders 
and Taiwanese. As presented in Table 3-1, up to 1957 no Taiwanese were recruited into 
the CSC. As Pang (1992, 67) reports “the first real native Taiwanese who resided in 
Taiwan before 1945 was recruited in to the CSC in 1969.”  The identity of the first 
Taiwanese as a member of the “highest elite circle” (Pang 1992, 67) is as important as 
becoming a member. Although, Pang (1992) argues that he was not nominated as the 
representative of the local capitalists, nonetheless, “he was the owner of a manufacturing 
corporation” (Pang 1992, 67). 
As Table 3-1 shows the number of Taiwanese increased significantly during the 
period of economic transformation. Between 1965 and 1984, while Taiwan’s economy 
was undergoing a substantial transformation, the number of Taiwanese in the CSC grew 
from 2 to 12 (38% of the total number). 
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Table 3-1. Economic transformation and power sharing in Taiwan. 






Total # of 
CSC 
Agriculture 
(% of GDP) 
Industry 
(% of GDP) 
1952 0 11 11 32.2 19.7 
1953 0 11 11   
1954 0 11 11   
1955 0 11 11 29.1 23.2 
1956 0 11 11 27.5 24.4 
1957 1 16 17 27.3 25.3 
1958    26.8 24.8 
1959 2 15 17 26.4 27.1 
1960 2 15 17 28.5 26.9 
1961 2 15 17 27.5 26.6 
1962 2 15 17 25.0 28.2 
1963 2 15 17 23.3 30.0 
1964 2 17 19 24.5 30.4 
1965    23.6 30.2 
1966 2 18 20 22.5 30.6 
1967 2 18 20 20.6 33.0 
1968    19.0 34.4 
1969 2 20 22 15.9 36.9 
1970 2 20 22 15.5 36.8 
1971    13.1 38.9 
1972 3 19 22 12.2 41.6 
1973 3 19 22 12.1 43.8 
1974    12.4 40.7 
1975    12.7 39.9 
1976 5 18 23 11.4 43.2 
1977    10.6 44.0 
1978 5 18 23 9.4 45.2 
1979 9 19 28 8.6 45.3 
1980    7.7 45.8 
1981 9 19 28 7.3 45.5 
1982    7.7 44.4 
1983    7.3 45.0 
1984 12 20 32 6.3 46.2 
Source: Pang (1992, 31-32, 66) 
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Whether one agrees with Pang (1992) that such incorporation came as a result of 
the KMT’s policy of “Taiwanization,” or with Lin (1998) that such power sharing was 
primarily motivated by regime survival, the point is that the KMT regime evolved toward 
a more inclusive regime over the years of economic transformation. This responsiveness 
indicates two equally important conclusions. First, it came about as a function of the 
economic transformation that Taiwan had undergone. Second, it differentiates the KMT 
regime from other authoritarian regimes where power is exclusively concentrated in the 
hands of a strong man or in a minority group (e.g., Syria). 
Lin (1998: 263, 264) argues that it was the combination of rising costs of 
continuing authoritarian regime (e.g., intra-elite divisions) and decreasing costs in 
tolerating opposition (e.g., expectation of winning electoral support, diminishing of 
perceived threats, stability of socioeconomic order) that marked the end of the KMT’s 
rule. Lin (1998) makes an important point by focusing on regime survival to explain 
regime change on Taiwan. Regime transformation is primarily a factor of perceived 
threat from the groups making claims for more political power in the system. The decline 
in the level and amount of the threat is likely to provide incentives for the ruling elites to 
initiate transition. Thus, despite the fact that Lin (1998) downplays19 the role of the 
socioeconomic changes in Taiwan, he seems to be correct in emphasizing the salience of 
regime survival for a transition to occur. Hence, the decisive factor seems to be the 
                                                 
19 Lin (1998), employing Dahl’s (1971) mutual security model, makes a strong argument about the factors 
that finally led the KMT’s elites to initiate the transition to democracy in the mid-1980s. He argues that 
socioeconomic transformation was not the driving force of transition. As he puts (1998, 4) it “…the KMT’s 
initiating reform was neither driven by the “economic miracle” nor motivated by the leader’s ideological 
commitment, but a calculated move driven by self interest, especially regime survival.” 
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decline in the perceived threat from the lower classes, which is likely to be conditioned 
by the economic transformation (i.e., income source) a society goes through.     
The data from the interviews (conducted between January 1995 and April 1996) 
with the elites from both ruling and opposition parties reveal some important information 
on what factors played an important role in initiating political reforms (Lin 1998, 261). 
Of the 66 legislators interviewed by Lin, 65.2% rank pressure from opposition as the 
most important factor in influencing the KMT to initiate political reforms, whereas 53.0% 
of the legislators think that the economic and social change that Taiwan had undergone 
was the most influential factor. More importantly, 63.6% of the members of the ruling 
party (the KMT) that were interviewed rank socioeconomic changes as the most 
important factor. 
Therefore the reduced threat from the lower classes, due mainly to changes in the 
economic structure, seems to be the key behind the democratization process in Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s economic transformation that started in the mid 1960s has brought about a 
rectangle-like (see Figure 2-3) society in which upward mobility of members of the 
society is not restricted to one direction. Because of such transformation, upward 
mobility does not necessarily pose a threat to elite’s interests. The Taiwanese 
democratization process sheds light on the relationship between economic transformation 
and pressure from lower classes, and elite’s behavior toward such pressure. The ruling 
elite of the KMT opened up politics after they secured their position in the system.20 As 
Lin (1998) has observed, the opening occurred after the KMT thought that the threat from 
                                                 
20 According to Lin (1998), however, this has resulted in preserving some authoritarian elements within the 
system.  
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the opposition forces had substantially declined and the odds of an electoral success were 
high. The KMT not only won the 1986 presidential elections but was also able to win the 
two subsequent presidential elections (1990 and 1996) as well.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
One of the main puzzles that this study seeks to solve is what shapes the outcome 
of the struggle for political power between the members of a society. During the process 
of interactions within a society, the ruling elite’s response to lower classes’ demands for a 
voice in the decision-making process is conditioned by the former group’s perception of 
the degree of threat posed by lower classes’ demands. As such, the transformation of the 
elites’ and/or non-elites’ interests lie behind more inclusive and sustainable governance. 
To determine what factors play a role in achieving wider political participation, I 
employed cross-sectional time series data for the 1960-1999 period to test hypotheses. 
The unit of analysis is country year. 
Dependent Variable 
The word democracy originates from a combination of two Greek words “demos-
people, and kratos-rule…” (Williams 1977). Over the years, however, there has been a 
lively discussion about what exactly constitutes a democratic system of governance. The 
essence of a democratic system lies in the fact that every member of a society/community 
has equal rights in forming his/her community. As such, equality and 
participation/inclusiveness lie at the heart of democracy (Dahl 1998). As Cohen (1971, 8) 
has put it democracy is “constituted by participation.” Toward this end, this chapter seeks 
to explain under what circumstances a society becomes more democratic (i.e., what 
accounts for a society achieving a substantial step toward wider participation). 
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The dichotomous measures used in the current literature (e.g., Przeworski et al. 
2000; Boix 2003) divide countries into two broad camps: Democracies and non-
democracies. Such broad classification, however, excludes cases that “posses some, but 
not all, of the properties that characterize full democracies” (Epstein et al. 2006, 551). 
This coding lumps Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia together and fails to 
distinguish substantial differences in, say, Saudi Arabia’s polity and that of Jordan.21 
Obviously the regimes in Algeria, Iran, Jordan, and Malaysia cannot be treated as 
full democracies. Nonetheless, treating regimes with some important democratic 
elements the same as regimes with essentially no democratic properties is fundamentally 
misleading. It is worth noting that, while acknowledging that the opposition was not 
allowed to win, Lipset (1960, 48 footnote # 8, emphasis added) classifies Mexico under 
PRI as a democracy because of “the existence of opposition groups [and] contested 
elections…[which] introduce[d] a considerable element of popular influence in the 
system.” 
Consider the Jordanian case. The Jordanian liberalization process, initiated in 
1989, has been “one of the most significant experiments in political liberalization in the 
Arab world” since the early 1990s (Mufti 1999, 100). The reform package not only 
legalized political parties but also ended martial law that had been in effect for more than 
20 years. It provided the grounds for the emergence of a relatively free and open press, 
                                                 
21 In Przeworski et al. (2000) and Boix (2003) data sets all of these countries are treated equally, non-
democracies. For another critic of dichotomous measures used by Przeworski et al. (2000) see Gates et al. 
(2006).  
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competitive elections, and the emergence of civil society (Ryan and Schwedler 2004, 
138, 141). 
Dichotomous measures, as employed in the current literature, therefore, fail to 
distinguish between countries that have made a substantial improvement toward 
democracy and that have not. Przeworski et al’s. (2000) and Boix’s (2003) dichotomous 
coding, for instance, fails to catch the important changes in Algeria and Jordan in 1989, 
El Salvador between 1964 and 1970, and Turkey in the late 1940s. A closer look at these 
cases clearly reveals that the dichotomous measures of democracy overlook a substantial 
variation in the level of democracy within these countries. Algeria, for instance, went 
through “politically significant” changes in 1989 and moved from –9 to –2 on the Polity 
scale (Esteshami 1999, 210). Similarly, the Turkish experiment with democratization that 
started in 1946 culminated in the opposition party’s victory in 1950 (its Polity score went 
up by 10 points from –7 to 7). 
Vanhanen’s (1997; 2000) index of democracy (id), which measures two important 
dimensions of democracy (participation and competition) confirms the argument that 
changes that have been overlooked because of the coding criteria used to identify 
democracies from non-democracies merit further scrutiny. The participation part of the 
index is measured as “the percentage of the total population who actually voted in the 
election” whereas competition is “calculated by subtracting the percentage of the votes 
won by the largest party from 100” (Vanhanen 1997, 34). The final score for id is 
obtained by multiplying these two scores and dividing the outcome by 100. Vanhanen 
identifies Turkey for the period between 1946 and 1960 as a democracy: The competition 
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and participation scores went up from 0 to 15.1 and from .5 to 38, respectively, in 1946 
and the index of democracy for Turkey increased from 0 to 5.74. The improvement 
continued and the id reached to 17.65 in 1950 when the opposition party took power. 
Some examples of nations that experienced substantial changes yet are coded as non-
democracies by Przeworski et al. (2000) and Boix (2003) are presented in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-1. Nations with major changes toward democracy coded as non-democracies by 
Przeworski et al. and Boix. 
 
Country Name Year Change in the Polity Score Change in Vanhanen’s id score 
Algeria  1989 7 points 1.21 
Turkey 1946 10 points 5.74* 
Iran 1980 4 points 5.11 
Jordan 1989 5 points  1.88 
Malaysia  1971 3 points 10.5** 
Taiwan 1987 6 points 5.17*** 
El Salvador 1964 3 points 1.19**** 
*The score reached to 17.65 in 1950.   
**This is the score for 1971. 
***This is the score for 1990.  
****The score reached to 5.68 in 1967. 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to analyze under what conditions a country takes 
a considerable step toward a more democratic system. As Cohen (1971, 8, emphasis 
added) has rightly summarized “the scale upon which actual democracies are appraised 
cannot be a single and simple one. Once having given up the supposition that democracy 
must be either altogether present or not present at all, it requires only a further adjustment 
of our expectations to recognize that it may be present in different respects, and to 
different degrees in each respect.” More specifically, democracy “is a process, not an end 
state. And it is often the case, the journey is more important than destination” (Epstein et 
al. 2006, 552). Therefore, to overcome the problems associated with the current 
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dichotomous measures of democracy, I used the Polity IV measure of regime change 
(regt and d4 variables) to identify a change toward democracy (CTD) within a society. 
Relying upon the Polity IV data,22 I defined a dichotomous variable to identify a 
CTD (defined as at least a 3-point increase in the Polity score) to tease out what factors 
account for such a change: What leads to a considerable step toward wider participation? 
The Polity IV data set conceives of a system as a democracy when there are “institutions 
and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders…institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive…[and] the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in 
acts of political participation.” (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 13)23 An autocracy, on the 
other hand, is characterized by the “lack of regularized political competition and concerns 
for political freedoms.” (Ibid.) The Polity2 variable is defined as the difference between 
these two composite measures (Democracy value – Autocracy value) and ranges from 
+10 (full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy). The 3-point threshold, to some extent, like 
any measure that attempts to identify and/or distinguish a system of governance from 
another, is inherently arbitrary. However, a closer analysis of events that have led to at 
least a 3-point increase versus 1 or 2-point increases reveals an important difference: The 
former indicates a substantial constitutional change. 
To clarify, consider the change that occurred in South Africa in 1994. Following a 
bloody and long civil conflict the apartheid regime came to an end and a new 
                                                 
22 Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. Dataset Users’ Manual. 
Accessed at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ on Feb. 21, 2006. Also, see Gurr (1974). 
23 Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. Dataset Users’ Manual. 
Accessed at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ on Feb. 21, 2006. 
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constitution, bill of rights, and universal suffrage went into effect in 1994 (Stearns 2001, 
1072). Consequently, the Polity score for South Africa increased from 6 to 9. That is, the 
3-point increase in South Africa’s Polity score reflects an important regime change 
because it allowed previously disfranchised groups to become a part of the political 
process. Vanhanen (2000) reports an increase of 15.06 (the id increased from 3.1 in 1993 
to 18.07 in 1994) for South Africa. 
Romania provides another example. The Polity score increased from 5 to 8 in 
1996. Following the fall of the Communist regime, the National Salvation Front (NSF) 
under Ion Iliescu’s leadership dominated the government until it was swept from power 
in 1996 (Stearns 2001; CIA World Factbook). Despite important changes following the 
demise of its communist regime, Romania remained dominated by the former 
communists who were accused of maintaining many of the former regimes’ policies 
(Stearns 2001, 902). This led Higley and Burton (2006, 51) to dub the first few years as 
“nominally democratic.” The 1996 elections, in which the opposition party swept the 
former communists from power, brought about important changes in Romania. 
According to Vanhanen’s data set Romanian democracy improved on both participation 
and competition indicators and the composite indicator (id) increased from 27.7 to 32.11 
within a year.24 
On the other hand, Chile had a 1-point increase in its polity score in 2000 when 
Lagos Escobar, a member of Socialist Party, won the presidential elections. Although the 
new president promised constitutional amendments and more civilian control over the 
                                                 
24 A change of 4.41 on the id scale might seem rather insignificant. Notice, however, a score of 5 on id 
scale is the threshold used to separate democracies from non-democracies in the same data set.  
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military (Stearns 2001), the change did not bring about substantial constitutional changes 
but rather showed a peaceful transfer of power from the incumbent to the opposition 
party. Vanhanen (2000) reports an increase of 1.66 on id scale for Chile in 2000. Notice, 
this is almost one third of the change that Romania had in 1996 with a three-point 
increase on the Polity scale. 
The South Korean case is instructive here. South Korea became a democracy in 
1987. The Polity score increased from –5 to 6 in 1988. Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix 
(2003), and Vanhanen (2000) data sets identify the regime in South Korea as a 
democracy after 1987. The Polity data reports a 2-point increase in 1998 for South Korea: 
The score increased from 6 to 8. However, this increase did not reflect a considerable 
change in the regime. Rather it came after the opposition party took power following the 
elections in 1997. Vanhanen (2000) does not report any changes in competition, 
participation, and index of democracy scores for South Korea in 1998. 
Likewise, Nicaragua went through a considerable change (the Polity score 
increased form –1 to 6) in 1990 when the revolutionary government handed over power 
to the united opposition’s (the National Opposition Union, UNO) presidential candidate, 
Chamorro, following the UNO’s electoral victory. In the Chamorro’s years the armed 
conflict declined and the country “overall progressed toward national reconciliation and 
democratic consolidation” (Booth et al. 2006, 88). Vanhanen (2000) reports an increase 
of 4.63 on the index of democracy for Nicaragua in 1990. In 1995 the country had a 2-
point increase in its Polity score. However, despite the fact that “a wide spectrum of 
politicians engaged in frequent bargaining, negotiation, and pact making” (Booth et al. 
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2006, 88), the changes did not bring about a new regime but rather reflected the internal 
bargaining among the powerful actors within the established framework. More 
specifically, it was a reflection of a series of negotiations and bargaining over how to 
establish civilian control over the armed forces and “unlink” it from Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) (ibid.). 
One could argue that a 3-point increase is qualitatively different from, say, a 5-
point increase. To address this problem, relying upon the Polity IV data set, I dissected 
CTDs into three categories based upon the degree of change. The polity data set identifies 
three types of regime changes: Positive regime change, minor democratic transition, and 
major democratic transition. The first category includes cases that experienced at least 3-
point increase in Polity score without a shift in regime type. Minor and major democratic 
transitions include cases that have 3-5 and 6 and greater point increase in Polity score, 
respectively, with a shift in regime type. A shift is defined as a change from “autocracy” 
(-10,0) to a “partial democracy” (1,6) or a “full democracy” (7,10) or a change from 
“partial democracy” to a “full democracy” (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual, 
34). 
This, however, is not an entirely satisfactory operationalization of changes toward 
democracy, since it underestimates considerable changes without a shift in regime type. 
Moving from 5 to 8 on the Polity scale, for instance, is coded as a minor democratic 
transition, whereas a change of seven point increase, say from –9 to –2, is treated as a 
positive regime change. Substantively, however, the latter, describes a more dramatic 
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change in regime type because it does represent an important shift toward 
democratization.  
To extend this argument, the creation of multiparty political system in Algeria in 
1989 marked the end of an era characterized by military rule (Stearns 2001, 992). 
Consequently, the score for Algeria increased by 7 points on the Polity scale (from –9 to 
–2). Similarly, the movement of the Young Turks in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries under the Ottoman Empire led to substantial changes in the political 
system. As Stearns (2001, 531, 533) summarizes, although the Young Turks Movement 
was not a complete success story, it did, however, culminate in the first constitutional 
government in the Ottoman Empire’s history in 1876 and the movement managed to 
strengthen its position in the 1908 revolution which resulted in parliamentary elections, 
dismantling of the secret police, ending censorship, and a reduction in the sultan’s power 
(Also see Kayali 1995). 
Notice that neither Algerian nor Ottoman political systems experienced any 
regime shifts as identified in the Polity IV data set. However, it is obvious from historical 
records and an increase of 7 and 6 points, respectively, (the Polity score for the Ottoman 
Empire increased from –10 to –4 in both events) that these changes were turning points in 
the countries’ political histories. As Esteshami (1999, 206, 210) writes regarding a 
country like Algeria “where meaningful elections had been almost completely absent in 
previous decades,” the introduction of multiparty elections at the local and national levels 
is “politically significant.” For the sake of comparison, consider the change in the 
Turkish democracy that culminated in a 5-point increase on the Polity scale (from +4 to 
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+9) in 1961. This change fulfils the Polity criteria of a shift since the country moved from 
a partial democracy to a full democracy. Nonetheless, it is hard to argue that the change 
that took place in Turkey in 1961 was substantially more important that the ones that took 
place in Algeria in 1989 and in the Ottoman Empire in 1876 and 1908 only because the 
change in Turkey includes a shift in the regime. Indeed, the latter events also describe a 
positive change toward a more inclusive and democratic system. 
To overcome this deficiency and obtain an ordered category of changes toward 
democracy I slightly modified the Polity’s categories. I identified four outcomes based on 
the point increase in a country’s Polity score, regardless of whether it had a shift in 
regime. The first outcome variable is defined as no change toward democracy and coded 
0 for every country-year accordingly. The second outcome variable reflects changes that 
culminated in a 3-point increase on the Polity scale. Similarly, changes that resulted in 3-
5 and 6 or greater point increases on the scale are coded 2 and 3, respectively, to obtain 
an ordered dependent variable.25 
In addition to the binary and ordered outcome variables defined above I regress 
the set predictors on a continuous variable (the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data 
set) that ranges from –10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic) to provide a 
robustness check for the results obtained from using a certain threshold to separate a 
democratic regime from an authoritarian one. As discussed earlier, dichotomous 
measures fail to distinguish between countries those have made a substantial 
improvement toward democracy and that have not (Epstein et al. 2006). Countries (and 
                                                 
25 Using the Polity IV categories, without the slight change I introduced, yielded similar results. 
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some periods) that have been coded as non-democracies in some studies (e.g., Przeworski 
et al. 2000; Boix 2003), such as Iran, Malaysia, Jordan, and Algeria, have made 
considerable improvements in their democratization attempts. Therefore, using the 
country year as the unit of analysis with a continuous measure of democracy might reveal 
important variation that otherwise would not have been captured. 
Independent Variables 
The core hypothesis is that a change toward a more inclusive system is a function 
of a change in the social and economic structure. It is difficult to measure whether any 
change has taken place in the upper and/or lower levels of a social structure. However, it 
is fair to assume that any changes that might affect the shape of a social structure will 
influence both the upper and lower-level groups. Several proxies are employed to 
measure such structural changes within a society. 
The data for the main covariates come from World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Manufactures exports as a percentage of merchandise exports was used to 
measure structural economic transformation (i.e., the degree of industrialization) within a 
social system. To analyze the impact of agrarian economy I used agricultural raw 
materials export as a percentage of merchandise exports. Fuel and ores and metals 
exports as percentages of merchandise exports were used to measure the effect of mineral 
economy on the decision to take a step toward democracy.  
Control Variables 
Obviously, given the multidimensional nature of the variable of interest, one 
should include control variables to obtain non-spurious statistical results. To this end, I 
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used several economic and social variables that have been found to be associated with the 
emergence of democratic regimes. 
Although the theory suggests that the gap between lower and upper classes should 
not have a negative effect on a taking a step toward higher levels of democracy, a large 
number of scholars have argued that income inequalities lower the prospects for 
democratization (e.g., Muller 1995, 1997; Ember et al. 1997; Vanhanen 1997; 2001; Boix 
2003). To measure income inequality I employed UTIP’s (University of Texas Inequality 
Project) estimated household income inequality data (EHII), derived from the 
econometric relationship between the UTIP’s industrial pay inequality and the World 
Bank’s Deininger and Squire data set.26 These data, however, are available only for the 
1963-1999 period. This variable can take values between 0 and 100, with higher values 
indicating higher levels of inequality. These data range from 24.77 to 59.09 for the 
sample used to estimate the models.  
The link between economic development and democratization has been well 
established (e.g., Lipset 1959; Helliwell 1994). If the theory proposed in this study is 
true, then it should not be increased wealth per se that accounts for achieving wider 
participation. The GDP per capita and illiteracy rate (total adult illiterates as a 
percentage of people ages 15 and above) were used to control for modernization effects 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003 and WDI, respectively).  
Some have argued that democracy is more likely to emerge and endure in 
homogeneous societies. Ethnic and religious divisions within a society tend to produce 
                                                 
26 The data were obtained from http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html on Feb. 16, 2006. 
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exclusionary regimes in which the dominance of some groups is established (e.g., 
Horowitz 1993; 2000). I employed ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) and religious 
fractionalization indices, which measure the probability of two randomly selected 
individuals from a country will be from different ethnic and religious groups, 
respectively, as proxies for the degree of social fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). 
Despite the disagreement among the scholars over the link between Islam and 
democracy, some have argued that Islam and democracy are incompatible mainly 
because Islam does not distinguish between religious and political communities 
(Huntington 1991-1992; 1996). Fish (2002: 5), on the other hand, argues that the 
subordination of women in Muslim societies lies behind the “democratic deficit” in 
Muslim countries. The percentage of Muslims in total population was used to control for 
this cultural argument (Fearon and Laitin 2003).   
The size of population can have a strong effect on the emergence of social and 
economic crises within a society. A large population can simply reduce the amount of 
resources available for the members of society and thus increase the level and amount of 
threat posed to the system. Population size is included to control for this effect. These 
data come from Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
Further to confront with the simultaneity problem between the variables, I lagged 
the economic variables. For instance, the share of agriculture and manufacturing sectors 
in total exports might follow the change in the political system, not vice versa. Similarly, 
having experienced a CTD might affect the income inequality and/or GDP per capita 
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within a society. Therefore, the percent of agriculture, minerals, manufactures, and fuel in 
total exports; the income inequality variable; the GDP pc, the illiteracy rate; and the 
population variables were lagged one year. The GDP pc and population variables were 
logged to eliminate statistical (i.e., skewness) and computational issues. 
Method 
The primary interest in this section is to analyze under what conditions a country 
takes a substantial step toward wider participation. The unit of analysis, therefore, is 
country year. I have defined three outcome variables: Two categorical and one 
continuous. 
The first categorical outcome variable is onset of a transition to a CTD, as defined 
above. It is coded 1 for all country-years in which a country experienced a transition 
toward wider participation and 0 for all others. Due to the binary nature of the dependent 
variable I used binary logit model to estimate the probability of taking such a step in a 
given year. Notice that the outcome variable is operationalized as at least a three-point 
increase on the Polity IV scale: A country can experience more than one CTD. Taking a 
step toward wider participation occurs gradually and in reality very few countries take 
another step immediately following the previous one. Therefore having had a CTD in the 
previous year should influence the chances to experience another CTD in the following 
year. Controlling for this eliminates the possibility of temporal dependency and provides 
a control for the previous experience.27 
                                                 
27 Fearon and Laitin (2003) adopt a similar strategy to estimate the civil war onset in a given year.  
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The second categorical dependent variable has more than two outcomes. As 
mentioned earlier, to provide a better explanation of under what conditions make a 
country more likely to take a step toward democracy one needs to control for the fact that 
not all changes toward democracy (i.e., CTDs) are alike. Binary logit model that 
estimates the probability of taking a three-point step toward democracy might obscure the 
variation among these events. Using the Polity IV data set I have identified four different 
outcomes, which can be ranked according to the degree of change, to analyze the 
relationship between the primary explanatory variables and the decision to move upward 
on the democracy scale. 
Here I assume a latent variable that lies between an autocratic regime (i.e., -10) 
and a democratic one (+10). I have specified four outcomes and three thresholds on the 
journey to democracy and I estimate the probability of observing each outcome as a 
function of a set of explanatory variables. Although, the distance between each of the 
outcome variables defined above may not be known and the distance between outcome 1 
(authoritarian regime or no change) and outcome 2 (defined as a three-point increase on 
the scale) may not be equal, it is plausible to assume that a six point increase, for 
instance, can be ranked above a three-point increase on the Polity scale.28 Therefore, I 
employed ordered logit model to conduct the analysis.29  
                                                 
28 This assumption is critical since I use ordered logit to estimate the model. Without such assumption the 
choice of model would be multinomial logit, which produced substantially similar results.  
29 The ordinal outcome variable (i.e., no change; three; three-five; and six and greater point change) is 
derived from the Polity measure of democracy (-10 to +10) scale. Since a substantial change toward 
democracy (i.e., CTD) is defined as at least a 3-point increase on the scale, countries near upper boundary 
(8 and above) will not have a chance to experience any change. To eliminate any potential bias that might 
be caused by such artificial restriction on the outcome variable, I estimated the model without such cases. 
The model, however, produced substantially the same results.   
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The third dependent variable is continuous and ranges from –10 (least 
democratic) to +10 (most democratic). This measure, as discussed above, comes from 
Polity IV data set and is intended to provide a robustness check. Due to the nature of the 
third outcome variable I employed ordinary least squares method to estimate the model. 
The methodological problems associated with cross sectional time series data 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity have produced a heated discussion over how to 
analyze such data. Following Beck and Katz’s (1995) critique of using generalized least 
square (GLS) to analyze panel data when the number of units is less than the number of 
time points, ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
has become a common practice among the political scientists. Unless the number of time 
points is substantially larger than the number of units, the GLS procedure produces 
smaller errors that lead to overconfident results (Beck and Katz 1995).30 In addition, 
Beck and Katz recommend using lagged dependent variable to mitigate serial correlations 
among the error terms.  
Analysis 
For the 1960-1999 period I was able to include 1,424 observations (i.e., country 
years) to estimate the models. The results are presented in Table 4-2. 
                                                 
30 In this study, although, this condition is satisfied for some countries, due to unbalanced panels, using 
GLS requires forcing the panels as if they were balanced. To avoid this I opted for using OLS with panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Using GLS, however, yielded similar results to those obtained from 
using OLS with PCSEs. Since the panels are unbalanced I used “xtpcse” command in Stata with “pairwise” 
option to analyze the data.  
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Table 4-2. Economic transformation and transition to wider participation, 1960-1999. 
Variable Logit  
 
Ordered Logit OLS 










































































Number of Observations  1,422 1424 1424 
Prob>Chi2 .002 <.001 <.001 
R Squared .07 .17 .92 
Note: Standard Errors in brackets (two-tailed). *: sig. at 10 percent level; **: sig. at 5 percent level; and ***: sig. at 
1percent level. The coefficients were obtained using Stata 9.1. All variables, except ethnic and religious 
fractionalization and Muslim variables, are lagged one year. The R2 values for logit and ordered logit models are 
Pseudo R2. The results from OLS model were obtained using Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) and were based 
on 90 countries. 
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The results indicate important findings. Of the explanatory variables, the 
measures of mineral wealth (fuel and non-fuel minerals exports) and the indicator of 
industrialization (manufactures exports) show noticeable effects on the outcome variable. 
The findings on fuel and non-fuel minerals confirm the argument proposed by the 
proponents of rentier state theory regarding the negative effects of mineral wealth on 
democratization. Nations with large amounts of mineral wealth are less likely to make a 
considerable CTD. This finding is robust across models. The effect of manufactures 
exports, however, is discernable only in OLS model. The analyses do not provide support 
for the expectation that an agrarian economy will lead to lower levels of democracy. Of 
the control variables, illiteracy rate and religious fractionalization substantially dampen 
the prospects for democratization in all models.   
The result from the logit model suggests that fuel exports significantly reduce the 
chances to make a transition to a CTD. Similarly, the coefficient produced in the ordered 
logit model is negative and discernable from zero. The hypothesis that a mineral 
economy hinders democratization is further supported by the negative and significant 
coefficient on non-fuel minerals. This effect is both substantially and statistically 
significant in the ordered logit and OLS models. The OLS coefficient suggests a .008 
decrease in the level of democracy on the Polity IV scale for every one percent increase 
in non-fuel minerals exports. 
It should be noted that the coefficients from binary and ordered logit models 
suggest only the direction and significance levels of each variable, not the magnitude. In 
nonlinear models the magnitude of a relationship between an exact change in an 
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explanatory variable and the outcome probability depends upon the levels of other 
variables in the model (Long and Freese 2003, 109). In order to provide a substantive 
interpretation for the effect of the predictors I converted the binary and ordered logit 
estimates into predicted probabilities. 
The marginal effects of significant variables (at 90 percent or better confidence 
level) were calculated as the difference between the predicted probabilities when the 
variable of interest increased by one standard deviation from its mean, holding other 
variables constant (i.e., at their means). Another way of measuring the effect of a given 
change in a continuous predictor on the outcome probability is to hypothetically allow the 
variable of interest to range from its minimum to maximum and then take the difference 
between the two predicted probabilities for these two values of predictor. As summary 
statistics display, however, most of the variables show large variation. 
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Table 4-3. Summary statistics for the independent variables. 
Variable 
 
Min Max Mean St. Dev. 
Manufactures Export (%)  0 93.52 32.79 27.08 
 
Agricultural Export (%) 0 70.06 7.23 9.43 
 
Fuel Export (%) 0 99.99 18.37 28.54 
 
Minerals Export (%) 0 99.07 8.76 27.08 
 
Income Inequality  24.77 59.09 44.27 5.32 
 
GDP per capita (logged) 5.97 10.58 7.92 .82 
 
Illiteracy Rate  .2 91.68 30.46 23.57 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  .004 .93 .40 .29 
 
Religious Fractionalization .02 .78 .33 .22 
 
Muslim (%) 0 100 27.10 38.08 
 
Population (logged) 6.25 13.85 9.36 1.44 
 
Note: Summary statistics are based on only those country-years included in the analyses.  
 
In reality no country experiences a change from minimum to maximum: It is 
unrealistic to assume that the manufactures or fuel exports, for instance, for a country will 
vary from minimum (0 %) to maximum (99.9 %).31 Therefore I opted for raising each 
variable by one standard deviation from its mean to evaluate the changes in the 
probability of observing the outcome variable as a function of an exact change in the 
variable of interest. The predicted probabilities from binary logit model are shown in 
Table 4-4. 
                                                 
31 These numbers are for the fuel exports variable. 
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Table 4-4. Marginal effects from one standard deviation change in significant predictors 
for binary logit model. 
 
               Predicted Probability 
Variable 
 
Mean  Mean (+) One St. Dev. Change  
Fuel Export (%) .026 .017 -.009 
Illiteracy Rate  .026 .017 -.009 
Religious Fractionalization .026 .015 -.011 
 
Table 4-4 displays only the effect of the significant variables. The last column 
shows the change in the probability of observing the outcome (i.e., transition to a CTD) 
as a function of an exact change in the predictor (i.e., one standard deviation increase 
from the mean). The result for the fuel exports variable, therefore, suggests that one 
standard deviation increase from the mean decreases the likelihood of making a transition 
to wider participation (i.e., CTD) by almost one percentage point. Similarly, an increase 
of one standard deviation from the mean for illiteracy rate and religious fractionalization 
dampens the chances for transition to a CTD by about one percentage point.     
Notice, however, that the binary logit model estimates how each predictor 
influences the probability of taking a substantial step toward democracy. It is worth 
reiterating that a CTD is defined rather broadly in the logit model. That is, every country-
year is coded 1 if that particular country experienced an increase of at least three-point 
change in its Polity score. As mentioned earlier, however, there is a need to dissect each 
of these changes since each event might be qualitatively different from another. 
The results from ordered logit model shed more light on the relationship between 
a change in each explanatory variable and a change in the outcome probability. As 
column 2 of Table 4-2 displays, mineral wealth, illiteracy rate, and religious 
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fractionalization significantly reduce the probability of democratization. The predicted 
probabilities for these variables provide a better understanding regarding the relationship 
between each of these predictors and the probability of observing the outcome 
variable(s). 
Table 4-5. Marginal effects from one standard deviation change in significant predictors 
for ordered logit model. 
         
Variable 
 
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4  
Fuel Export (%) .09 -.025 -.01 -.06 
Minerals Export (%) .13 -.04 -.01 -.09 
Illiteracy Rate  .17 -.05 -.018 -.10 
Religious Fractionalization .20 -.06 -.02 -.12 
 
As presented in Table 4-5, a one standard deviation increase in fuel exports 
lowers the chances of observing a three-point increase on the Polity scale (outcome 2) by 
2.5 percentage points. This effect becomes stronger for outcome 4 (six-point or greater 
increase on the Polity scale): It lowers the probability of such change by 6 percentage 
points. Consistent with dampening effect of an increase in the fuel exports on observing a 
CTD, an increase of one standard deviation from the mean increases the probability of 
observing no movement toward democracy (outcome 1) by 9 percentage points. 
Likewise, an increase of one standard deviation from the mean for the non-fuel mineral 
exports lowers the chances of observing a major democratic transition identified as six or 
greater point change in the Polity score (outcome 4) by 9 percentage points. Of the 
control variables, illiteracy rate and religious fractionalization dampen the chances for 
democratization, and their effects are substantial: Every one standard deviation increase 
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from the mean decreases the probability for outcome 4 by 10 and 12 percentages points, 
respectively. 
The effects of the variables that were found to have a discernable effect on the 
outcome in binary and ordered logit models – mineral wealth, illiteracy rate, and religious 
fractionalization – (see Table 4-2) are confirmed by the results obtained from the OLS 
model. Although the fuel variable does not achieve statistical significance, the second 
measure of a mineral economy, non-fuel minerals exports, leads to a .008 decline in the 
level of democracy for every percentage increase in the minerals exports. Of the 
explanatory variables, manufactures exports seem to increase the level of democracy, but 
this relationship is appreciable only in the OLS model. Every one percent increase in 
manufactures exports is associated with a .006 increase in the level of democracy on the 
Polity IV scale. 
Of the control variables education (i.e., illiteracy rate) substantially affects the 
prospects for democratization. It is worthwhile to draw attention to the insignificant 
relationship between GDP pc and democratization. The education effect, on the other 
hand, is quite strong and robust across all models. The OLS coefficient, for instance, 
implies that as a country eradicates illiteracy it improves its democracy: Every one 
percentage decline in the illiteracy rate leads to a .01 point positive change the level of 
democracy. As such the findings confirm Lipset’s (1960, 56) argument that the effect of 
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education is “more direct and strong” and as “all the relevant studies indicate…education 
is more significant than either income or occupation.”32 
The negative effect of the religious fractionalization variable is confirmed by the 
coefficient obtained from OLS model. Although, the OLS model produces a positive and 
significant relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic fractionalization, this 
effect is not robust across models. Similarly, the OLS results show some weak support 
for the argument that the prospects of democratization in Muslim societies are low. 
Conclusion 
Regime formation in general and democratization in particular are a function of 
interactions between upper and lower classes. Despite a large body of literature on the 
causes of democratic transitions there is no consensus over the casual mechanism. In 
other words scholars disagree over the relative importance of social classes (i.e., 
bourgeoisie, labor, landed elite) and of socioeconomic development (e.g., increased 
wealth) in bringing about or blocking wider participation. 
The prominent role that Moore (1966, 418) assigns to the bourgeoisie as the 
engine of liberal democratic regimes -“no bourgeoisie, no democracy”- has been 
criticized by others (e.g., Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Bellin 2000). Modernization theory, 
which emphasizes the impacts of socioeconomic development on democratization, has 
been challenged by some on the grounds that it does not provide an explanation for the 
                                                 
32 To check the robustness of the findings and control for possible collinearity between the “illiteracy” and 
“GDP pc” variables, I ran the models without the former variable. Dropping the “illiteracy” variable from 
the models increased the significance level of GDP pc variable. However, it reached significance only in 
the ordered logit model. Put differently, adding the illiteracy variable washes away the GDP pc effect. 
These alternative specifications strengthen the conclusion reached by Lipset (1960): education has a 
stronger effect than income.  
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transition to democracy. Critics point to the lack of a common pattern to the emergence 
of democratic regimes and contend that “the emergence of democracy is not brought 
about by development. Rather, democracy appears exogenously as a deus ex machina” 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 159).33 
Building upon modernization theory some (e.g., Vanhanen 1997; Muller 1995; 
1997) have argued that democratization is a function of economic development that 
produces a large middle class thereby reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. 
The emphasis on economic equality becomes more visible in Boix’s (2003) theory of 
democratization. Building upon the framework that was first advanced by Anderson 
(1992) and later extended, refined, and generalized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 
2001), Boix assets that economic inequality lies behind both the emergence and survival 
of democratic regimes. 
However, despite a large body of literature on the genesis of democratic regimes, 
the role of the elites (i.e., upper classes) in the formation of democratic systems of 
governance has been undermined or not received enough attention. Putting the seminal 
works by John Higley and his colleagues aside (see, for instance, Burton et al. 1992; 
Higley and Burton 2006), students of regime formation and democratization have 
primarily ignored the power difference between upper and lower classes in a 
socioeconomic structure. Failing to recognize the power imbalances between the rich and 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that Przeworski and Limongi (1997) contend that modernization theory fails to explain 
transition to democratic regimes yet it provide an explanation to why an increase in wealth, as the key to 
the theory, is associated with more durable democratic regimes. For more on this see next chapter.   
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the poor has led many to conclude that pressure from below (i.e., threat from the lower 
classes) accounts for the emergence of democratic regimes.  
Pressure from below, although an important factor in triggering the process of 
democratization, at best can serve as an intervening variable. Pressure from below for 
wider participation, I have argued, can serve to initiate a transition to a higher level of 
democracy to the extent that socioeconomic development enables the lower classes to 
gain leverage without threatening the upper classes’ established position in the system. 
As such this study fills the gap, which has been overlooked in the recent democratization 
literature, by emphasizing the role of elites (and linking it to socioeconomic 
development) for a democratic regime to flourish. Further, it shows that the source of 
wealth or enrichment matters - a finding that confirms Carles Boix’s (2003) and others’ 
findings – and provides evidence for the argument that transition to democracy is not 
random but rather has some common and observable patterns. 
Another important contribution of this project is that it dissects the journey to 
democracy (Epstein et al. 2006, 552) by employing several operationalizations of 
democratization. Democracy, as Epstein et al. (2006, 552) put it, “is a process, not an end 
state. And it is often the case, the journey is more important than destination.” In the long 
journey to democratization steps taken by societies have been inadequately modeled by 
current studies due mainly to arbitrary thresholds used to separate democracies from non-
democracies. Ignoring an important change toward higher levels of democracy just 
because that particular country did not pass the arbitrary cut off introduced by the current 
studies misses important aspects of the transition journey. Obviously there is a need to 
 90
distinguish democracies from non-democracies and such separation will naturally involve 
some arbitrary elements. What this study has shown, however, is that there is a need to 
consider every important steps taken by a country in its journey to democracy. That is, 
democratization is a gradual phenomenon, and there is a need to model that phenomenon 
by analyzing every substantial change toward the end. 
Along the journey toward democracy an economic transformation that provides 
alternative avenues for power lessens the type and the degree of threat associated with the 
lower classes’ demands. That is, as a socioeconomic structure evolves from a “pyramid” 
to a “diamond,” the nature of pressure from below alters in a way that convinces the 
upper classes that “they could manage equally well” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 78) in a 
more democratic environment. 
It should be noted, however, even in Lipset’s diamond like social structure there 
exists a gap between the upper and lower classes. What is crucial is that the 
empowerment of the previously disfranchised segments of the society should not come at 
the expense of the established elites’ vested interests. Factors that threaten the elites’ 
interest, I have argued, reduce the chances for democratization. As such, the results 
confirm the expectation that abundant mineral wealth provides incentives for the owners 
(i.e., elites) to cling to the power since pressure from below is more likely to be perceived 
as a direct threat to the upper classes’ control over resources. This is in accordance with 
the rentier state theory (e.g., Luciani 1987) and other works (e.g., Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001; Boix 2003) that have proposed a negative relationship 
between abundant mineral wealth and democratization.  
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Although I have not explicitly modeled the effect of elites in bringing about a 
democratic regime, due mainly to difficulties in overcoming a potential tautology 
problem,34 the gap between the rich and the poor (i.e., economic inequality) can serve as 
a good proxy for whether elites’ interests are threatened by the introduction of democratic 
institutions. The argument that high levels of economic inequality should not be inimical 
to transition to higher levels of democracy but rather should facilitate it by providing 
incentives for the upper classes has been supported by the empirical analyses. The 
findings indicate that higher levels of economic inequality help to achieve higher levels 
of democracy. This effect comes very close to statistically significance level in ordered 
logit (p-value= .12 at two-tailed) and OLS (p-value= .13 at two-tailed) models. Economic 
equality does not constitute a necessary precondition for the emergence of democratic 
regimes, a conclusion in contrast to the prevalent view (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006b) on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization.35 
I have failed to find support for the proposition on the negative link between an 
agrarian economic structure and democratization. However, this non-significant finding 
sheds light on the link between elites and regime change. As discussed earlier, what lies 
behind wider participation in an agrarian economy is the transformation of the elites from 
growers to the exporters/intermediaries (see, for instance, Paige 1997). This does not 
necessarily mean a substantial reduction in the agrarian sector’s share. On the contrary so 
long upper classes do not derive a large amount of their revenues from land a strong 
                                                 
34 For more on this point see next chapter. 
35 This effect becomes stronger in survival of democratic regimes. For a detailed discussion on how 
inequality and elite’s support influence the duration of a democratic system of governance see next chapter. 
 92
agrarian economy ceases to be an obstacle for wider participation. It should be noted that 
the agricultural sector’s share in total GDP was at about 25 percent in Costa Rica, the 
most stable and democratic country in the region, and Guatemala, the most repressive 
regime in the region, in the early 1980s. The Costa Rican elites, however, have not been 
dependent upon the land as their primary income source. This finding, therefore, not only 
supports the proposition first advanced by Moore (1966) in his seminal work, Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, about the antidemocratic nature of landlords, but 
also clarifies the link between agrarian economy and democratic regimes; so long those 
occupy the higher echelons of a socioeconomic ladder do not depend upon land as their 
principal income source a large agrarian sector is not an obstacle against democratic 
regimes. 
Overall the results suggest that it is not increased wealth per se or economic 
equality that account for democratization. Notice that despite the positive coefficient in 
all three models, the effect of the measure of increased wealth, GDP pc, is not 
appreciable. As such, the findings support the conclusion reached by Adam Przeworski 
and his colleagues. That is an increase in wealth, as argued by the proponents of the 
Modernization theory, does not lead to an onset of democratic regimes, characterized by 
greater participation and inclusion of the previously disfranchised groups into the system. 
Nevertheless, the findings further point to a rather complicated mechanism between 
economic development and democratization. Put differently, it may not be an increase in 
wealth per se that drives the transition to democratic regimes. The results from this study, 
nonetheless, give support the modernization hypothesis that economic development 
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accounts for the emergence of democratic regimes through transforming the shape of 
social structure. The Modernization hypothesis, therefore, seems to be correct for 
different reasons. It is not increased wealth that lies behind democratic regimes but rather 
a specific type of economic development that enables lower classes to gain power within 
the system without threatening the elites’ position on the social ladder. As such, this 
study strengthens the proposition laid out by John Higley and his colleagues on the sine 
qua non element of democracies, elites. 
A more important question, however, is whether the dynamics of transition to and 
survival of democratic regimes are different. More specifically, how does large oil-
revenues influence the survival of a democratic regime? Is oil-wealth inherently a curse 
or can it become a blessing under certain circumstances? How do economic inequality, 
changes in the socioeconomic structure, and elites’ support affect the durability of a 
change toward democracy? This task is undertaken in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V 
DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL: A DIFFERENT GAME? 
Introduction 
The evidence from empirical analyses and insights from several democratization 
cases (e.g., El Salvador, Taiwan, Britain) point to the crucial role that nature of wealth 
and elite coalition play on the journey to democratization. The evolution of the nations’ 
socioeconomic structure paves the way to extending the franchise to the previously 
excluded segments of a society. The type of economic structure is the principal factor 
behind the emergence of radical (moderate) opposition among the non-elites. It also 
determines the type of conflict that ensues between elites and non-elites. The empirical 
analyses lend support to the argument that the owners of abundant mineral resources opt 
for authoritarian regimes. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that a mineral 
economy generates a substantial fear among the elites that leads them to resort necessary 
means to secure their position on the socioeconomic ladder. As such, the results 
strengthen the conclusion of previous studies (e.g., Beblawi and Luciani 1987; 
Wantchekon and Neeman 2002; Boix 2003) regarding the negative influences of mineral 
wealth on the prospects for democratization. 
It should be noted, however, that the empirical analyses do not provide any 
support for the expectation that an agrarian economic structure tends to generate 
exclusionary politics. Insights from countries with substantial agrarian sectors, such as El 
Salvador, shed more light on such insignificant findings. As discussed in the previous 
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chapter, despite a large agricultural sector in El Salvador, it was the evolution of the 
elites’ interests that laid the groundwork for wider participation: The transformation of 
elites from owners to intermediaries (see, for instance, Paige 1997) facilitated the 
incorporation of the lower classes’ demands into the system. 
As such the findings clarify the linkage between economic structure and wider 
participation by introducing the vitality of the elites into the equation. Putting the seminal 
works by John Higley and his colleagues (e.g., Burton et al. 1992; Higley and Burton 
2006) aside, the current democratization studies have by and large overlooked the power 
difference between the elites and non-elites. With very few exceptions (i.e., Przeworski 
and Limongi 1997; Collier 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000) current democratization studies 
tend to lump transition to and survival of a democratic regime together. In what follows I 
contend that the dynamics of transition to and survival of democratic regimes are 
different: Factors that have been found to dampen the chances for wider participation or 
are not related the onset of a democratic system of governance show discernable impacts 
on the durability of the democratic regimes if they do come into being. In a nutshell, the 
analysis points to the positive effects of mineral wealth and income inequality on the 
prospects of democratic survival and strengthen the hypothesis proposed by Higley and 
Burton (2006) with regard to the “sine qua non” element of liberal democracies: Elites. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I show evidence, albeit scarce, from the 
previous studies with regard to the need to distinguish transition to and survival of 
democratic regimes. Then, I parse out the mechanism through which mineral wealth and 
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economic inequalities facilitate the survival of a democratic opening. The hypotheses are 
tested against a global data set for the period between 1960 and 1999. 
Democracy Dissected 
Despite a large body of the literature on the link between economic development 
and democracy, first advanced by Lipset (1959), there is a need to distinguish the 
different dynamics at play in transition to and survival of an incident of democratization. 
The presumption regarding the linkage between these two phenomena is that “democracy 
takes root and survives where levels of economic development and education are high” 
(Helliwell 1994, 225). Scholars such as Lipset (1959, 1960) and Helliwell (1994) have 
argued that economic development not only provides the ground for a stable and efficient 
democratic regime but also facilitates transition from an authoritarian regime to a 
democratic system of governance. Implicit in these works is the notion that the role of 
economic development is assumed to be the same with regard to transition to and survival 
of a democratic regime. 
Despite this generalization, however, the oft cited quote from Lipset ties 
economic well-being with democratic survival: “Perhaps the most widespread 
generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that 
democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely, this means that 
the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” 
(Lipset 1959, 75, emphasis added). In addition, Lipset, himself, clearly points to the 
possibility of differences in the dynamics that lead to a transition to a democratic regime 
versus those help sustain it afterwards. Referring to Weber’s hypothesis regarding the 
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relationship between capitalist industrialization and modern democracy, Lipset (1960, 46, 
emphasis in original) argued that “…an extremely high correlation between…income, 
education, and religion, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, in any given 
society should not be anticipated even on theoretical grounds because, to the extent that a 
political subsystem of the society operates autonomously, a political form may persist 
under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form. Or a political form may 
develop because of a syndrome of unique historical factors even though the society’s 
major characteristics favor another form.”  
Further, recent studies by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000) have cast doubt on the modernization hypothesis 
in general and the assumed link between economic development and democracy in 
particular. The most notable finding from these studies is that “the emergence of 
democracy is not brought about by development. Rather, democracy appears exogenously 
as a deus ex machina. It survives if a country is “modern,” but it is not a product of 
“modernization”” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 159). They add that authoritarian 
regimes also become more stable when they reach a level of about $6,000 per capita 
GDP.36 That is, economic development has no substantial impact on the transition to 
democracy, but rather influences its survival. 
Epstein et al. (2006, 551), in their critique of Przeworski and his colleagues’ 
challenge to modernization theory, argue that “they mistakenly interpret their own 
estimates in a manner that predisposes them to reject the modernization hypothesis.” 
                                                 
36 1985 PPP USD. 
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Using a trichotomous rather than the dichotomous measure of democracy employed by 
Przeworski and his colleagues, they found that higher incomes per capita significantly 
increase both the likelihood of transition to democracy as well as the durability of 
democracies. Regardless of whether one agrees with Przeworski et al.’s conclusion or 
with that of Epstein et al., the debate indicates the necessity of dissecting an incident of 
democratization and distinguishing among factors that facilitate a democratic transition 
and those that help sustain democracy. 
I side with Przeworski et al. (2000) and Collier (1999) when they argue that the 
dynamics of the transition to and survival of a more democratic system of governance are 
different. As this study clarifies, factors that have been found to be associated with 
transition to a more participatory regime and those that facilitate its survival are different. 
Factors that can block the transition to wider participation or have no discernible effect 
on such an event might become a useful tool to sustain the very same event. Of these 
factors economic inequality and mineral wealth merit scrutiny. 
Inequality, Elites, and Democratic Survival 
Proponents of the equality-democracy hypothesis (Muller 1995, 1997; Ember et 
al. 1997; Vanhanen 1997, 2001; Boix 2003) have pointed to the inimical effects of 
inequalities of various forms on democratization.37 The underlying assumption in these 
studies is that power concentration provides incentives for the owners of power (i.e., 
resources) to opt for authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, and derail the democratic 
process out of fear of the majority’s (the poor) pressure for redistribution, on the other. 
                                                 
37 For more on this, see Manus I. Midlarsky (1997).  
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Democracy, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 938) have summarized, becomes a 
preferred outcome for the poor for its distributional consequences. That is, the poor 
demand democracy since “…in democracies [they] impose higher taxes on the rich than 
in nondemocratic societies. This…simultaneously [gives] the rich an incentive to oppose 
democracy.” 
Nonetheless, economic inequality exists in all forms of regimes, and asset 
redistribution is not a defining feature of democracies. On the contrary, most drastic 
redistributive policies have been undertaken during authoritarian regimes and have been 
used as instruments of legitimization of the authoritarian order. Land reform, for instance, 
the most influential remedy to the most obvious form of inequality in developing and 
less-developed countries, has been implemented to sustain authoritarian regimes. The 
beneficiaries of Marcos’ land reform in the Philippines in the early 1970s, for instance, 
became “a significant source of rural support” for the authoritarian regime until its 
collapse in 1986 (Mackie and Villegas 1993, 104). Similarly, despite the fact that “most 
of the land [was] held in very small plots by millions of landowning families” (Mackie 
1993, 90), Indonesia remained an authoritarian country for decades. Nondemocratic 
governments in South Korea and Taiwan, for instance, redistributed 50 and 24.6 percent 
of the arable land in 1949 and 1949-1953, respectively, to defuse rural protests and 
insurrections inspired by land reforms in North Korea and mainland China (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2001). Nonetheless, neither country experienced any substantial political 
regime change until the mid-1980s (with the exception of South Korea’s short-lived 
democratic stint in 1960). Likewise, the authoritarian Latin American and Caribbean 
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countries that implemented successful land reforms (e.g., Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico) did not 
experience any substantial political regime changes after redistribution of the land (see, 
for instance, Meyer 1989; Dorner 1992).  
In addition, the assumption that “the median voter, who is a poor individual, will 
set taxes to maximize his income” (Boix 2003, 23; see also Acemoglu and Robinson 
2001) in a democratic regime may not hold. Transition to democracy does not necessarily 
change the balance of power between previously disfranchised segments of a society and 
powerful groups. Nel tests whether “higher levels of inequality lead, in democracies at 
least, to government initiatives to redistribute wealth through progressive tax systems” 
(2005, 23) and concludes that “it is naïve to believe that the introduction of competitive 
elections and extension of civil liberties would of itself negate the impact of hegemony 
and promote redistribution” (2005, 36). Nel’s findings suggest that transition to electoral 
democracy does not help the poor but rather strengthens the rich and concentrates income 
(also, see Bollen and Jackman 1985, 447-448). These findings cast doubt on the proposed 
link between democracy and the power of median voters (lower classes) to levy high 
taxes on the rich. Ruling elites in such societies are more likely to manipulate the system 
in such a way as to block redistribution; “so long as people whose interests are threatened 
by reform hold power, they will find ways of assuring that legislation will be ineffective” 
(Dorner 1992, 35). 
The approach proposed in this study suggests that transformation of elites’ and/or 
lower classes’ interests is the key behind more inclusive regimes. As mentioned earlier, 
some members of the traditional elites might lose some of their privileges during such 
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transformation. Yet, unless a substantial segment of the governing elite transformed in a 
way that allowed them to escape the threat posed by lower classes, transition to a more 
inclusive polity is not likely. More importantly, even if transition occurs because of some 
unforeseen events - ranging from economic bottlenecks, succession crisis, changes in the 
international political and economic context – such transitions are not likely to be durable 
due to uneven power balances between upper and lower classes. 
Obviously this is not the first study that emphasizes the role of elites in 
democratization. A large number of scholars, such as Lipset (1960), O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986), and Collier (1999), have pointed to the importance of elites in the 
emergence of democratic regimes. John Higley and Michael Burton (2006, 1-2), perhaps, 
have assigned the most prominent role to elites in the formation and consolidation of 
liberal democracies: “The sine qua non of liberal democracy is a well-articulated, 
internally accommodative, and relatively secure political elite….” 
Higley and Burton (2006, 140) point to the possibility of “elite convergence” by 
which a disunited elite gradually becomes united and reaches a consensus over the rule of 
the game and judges that “participation in free and fair democratic elections does 
jeopardize their vital interests.” However a consensually united elite, as the cornerstone 
of a stable and representative regime, often forms following sudden and deliberate 
negotiations among powerful groups during the state formation or nation building 
process. This, as Higley and Burton (2006, 3) have also acknowledged, brings about a 
potential tautology problem: “If elites chose to practice liberal democratic politics, then 
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liberal democratic politics will be practiced.”38 This is especially problematic with regard 
to the emergence of democratic regimes following sudden and deliberate negotiations 
among the elites; it is extremely difficult to identify whether elite settlement precedes the 
formation of democratic regime, an essential component for making any sort of casual 
claim regarding the roles of elite in the democratization process.  
The theory proposed in this study rests upon the assumption that there already 
exists a division between the upper and lower strata of the socioeconomic ladder. The 
central puzzle is to determine under what conditions the rich opt to accommodate the 
lower classes’ demands and, once disfranchised segments of a society are incorporated, 
what account for the sustainability (i.e., longevity) of such change. In other words, did 
the elite play an important role in forming the new regime? Or were they excluded from 
the process? Due to theoretical and operational difficulties, I opt to analyze the role of the 
elites on the durability of a change toward democracy. The visibility of political elite’s 
involvement in an important change toward wider participation in an existing 
socioeconomic structure eliminates a potential tautology: In an existing structure it is 
easier to observe whether the new regime came into being with the elites’ consent or 
whether it occurred contrary to their consent. 
With the exception of revolutions, in which the established elite is eliminated 
throughout the revolutionary process, elites often preserve their power within the system 
even after the inclusion of the majority (i.e., non-elites). Drastic redistributive measures 
                                                 
38 Higley and Burton (2006, 3) acknowledge a potential tautology problem. As they put it “this is, of 
course, tautology: if elites chose to practice liberal democratic politics, then liberal democratic politics will 
be practiced. But it is a matter of record that elites seldom make this choice.” 
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from lower classes, presumably empowered by the introduction of power-sharing 
mechanisms and tools for wider participation, will generate a power struggle between the 
poor and the rich. If the legislature begins enacting redistributive reforms, the elite may 
withdraw from the system, bringing about the collapse of the regime. Transitions that are 
not supported or led by the ruling elites, therefore, will not produce stable democratic 
regimes. 
This does not indicate that the class structure is irreversible and permanent. On 
the contrary, emphasizing the importance of groups that occupy higher echelons of a 
socioeconomic ladder and allowing for the possibility of a change in the identity of those 
groups better explain rare situations where, according to Higley and Burton (2006, 25), 
“consensually united” elite becomes “disunited.” The united elite in Venezuela that was 
formed in the late 1950s has become disunited/disintegrated over time (Higley and 
Burton 2006). This study, however, suggests that the seemingly disentangled elite 
structure in Venezuela is a function of the struggle between lower (non-elites) and upper 
classes (elites), from which the former group has gained some momentum over years. 
Since Higley and Burton do not distinguish among lower and upper classes but instead 
emphasize the pivotal role of political elites in influencing the outcome of the struggle, 
they conclude that Venezuela’s “consensually united” elite has undergone a 
“disintegration” process. The apparent struggle or “disintegrated” elite structure is a 
product of lower classes’ attempt to consolidate their power and replace the 
traditional/established elites, a process and a goal that has not been accomplished yet: 
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The extent to which the lower classes succeed to replace the entrenched elites will 
determine the outcome.39 
Focusing on the groups that are at the top of a socioeconomic ladder regardless of 
their identity provides an opportunity to parse out the outcome of the power struggle 
between elites and non-elites in a parsimonious way. As explained earlier, crucial is the 
empowerment of lower classes without endangering the established elites’ position within 
the socioeconomic structure. As such the theory proposed in this study sheds light on the 
dynamic of democratic survival in countries with high incomes per capita. Higher 
incomes per capita, perhaps one of the most robust findings in the current democracy 
literature, help democracies to endure not due to the higher amount of wealth per se. 
Rather as the economy grows and evolves from a pyramid to a diamond alternative paths 
to power emerges for the new actors on the social ladder. 
However, even in a diamond-like social stratification system there exists a 
hierarchy and elites often preserve their status in the system. What facilitates the survival 
of democratic regimes, therefore, is economic transformation from which new paths for 
upward social mobility emerge without leading to drastic reductions in the upper classes’ 
power. As such, an industrial economy is likely to help sustain democratic regimes by 
providing alternative paths for the lower classes to better their position on the social 
ladder. Therefore I expect a step taken toward wider participation (i.e., once a country 
achieved a substantially higher level of democracy) to survive longer in an industrial 
economy. 
                                                 
39 For more on this see next chapter.  
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The emergence of alternative channels for upward social mobility, mainly as a 
function of economic transformation, does not necessarily imply a substantial change in 
relative economic and political power of the two main classes: The rich and the poor. The 
gap between the rich and poor may narrow over time. Nevertheless, it is crucial that such 
narrowing of the rich-poor gap should not come at a direct expense of the upper classes. 
As Lipset (1960: 64, emphasis added) has aptly put it, the relatively narrower gap 
between the rich and the poor in developed (i.e., democratic) societies “…has been 
facilitated by the over-all increase of national income…not so much by reduction of the 
income of the relatively rich as by the faster growth of the income of the relatively 
poor.”40 This implies that the gap between the upper and lower classes should not have 
deleterious effects on the decision to open up the system, on the one hand, and this gap is 
more likely to provide strong incentives for the elites to abide by the rules of the game 
(democracy), on the other. The discussion is summarized in the following hypotheses.      
Hypothesis 5-1: A change toward democracy will survive longer in an industrial 
economic structure.  
Hypothesis 5-2: Income inequality helps sustain a change toward democracy by 
providing incentives to the elites to abide by the rules of the game.  
Hypothesis 5-3: A change toward democracy is more likely to be more durable if the 
change is initiated and/or supported by the elites. 
From this perspective, an agrarian economic structure should increase the risk for 
an authoritarian backlash since lower class demands in an agrarian socioeconomic 
                                                 
40 Lipset (1960, 64 footnote # 32, 33) quotes the United Nations Preliminary Report on the World Social 
Situation (New York: 1952), pp. 132-33. 
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structure are likely to be zero-sum. The conflict between lower classes, empowered by 
transition, and upper classes becomes a conflict over ownership. The landed elite in such 
a structure is “unwilling and unable to grant any political and economic concessions and 
dependent on legal or extralegal force for its economic survival” (Paige 1975, 58). This is 
partly due to the immobile nature of wealth (Boix 2003) and partly to the relatively low 
revenues obtained from the principal income source. This is the central feature that 
distinguishes an agrarian economy from a mineral economy.      
Hypothesis 5-4: A change toward democracy is more likely to fail in an agrarian 
economy. 
Mineral Wealth and Democratic Survival 
Scholars that have proposed a negative relationship between mineral wealth – 
both fuel and non-fuel minerals – and the emergence and sustainability of democratic 
regimes often rely on the rentier state framework, which emphasizes the inimical effects 
of external rents on state-society relations (e.g., Luciani 1987; Ross 1999; 2001; Luciani 
2005). Extensions of this framework have pointed to the distributional issues associated 
with natural resource abundance. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004, 819) have argued that 
the politics in regimes with abundant natural resources is more likely to be “dominated by 
the issues concerning the distribution of resource rents.” Abundant resources provide 
leaders with a tool to hold on to power by employing negative (i.e., repression) and/or 
positive incentives (i.e., buy off opposition). This effect, the authors argue, does not go 
away in “democratic systems with legitimate political competition” (ibid., 821). 
Democratically elected leaders, with massive amounts of resource wealth at their 
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discretion, will behave in a similar pattern. They will use the resource wealth to reinforce 
their rule by either repressing the opposition or buying their political support, which in 
turn will push the opposition forces to resort to violent means to take over; making the 
collapse of the regime more likely. 
Likewise, Boix (2003) draws attention to the negative political consequences of 
fixed assets (i.e., land and minerals). Boix lumps land and fuel resources together and 
argue that because of immobile nature of these resources the owners have strong 
incentives to establish authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, and acts as a disruptive 
force under democracy, on the other. 
These studies, however, brush aside the fact that the rules of the game undergo 
substantial changes as a function of the change in the political system. More specifically, 
once a country passes a certain threshold (i.e., becomes more democratic) the new rules 
will impact social actors’ behavior and their cost-benefit calculations. A recent study by 
Mehlum et al. (2006) found that the alleged relationship between resource wealth and 
economic development is primarily conditioned by the quality of institutions. Using 
indices such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption in government, risk of 
appropriation, and risk of government repudiation of contracts, to generate an index of 
institutional quality, they conclude “…countries with different institutions react 
differently to higher resource income…(p. 1128). In a similar vein, Robinson et al. (2006, 
450) parse out the relationship between resource wealth and institutional quality and 
conclude that the assumed negative consequences of resource wealth is primarily a 
function of political institutions. Institutions that “promote accountability of 
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politicians…[and]…state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since 
these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create.” 
The case of Botswana, a stable democratic regime with large extractive resources, 
illustrates the point. Acemoglu et al. (2003), in their detailed analysis of Botswana’s 
success in terms of economic growth despite its substantial natural resource wealth (i.e., 
copper, nickel, and diamonds)41, point to the importance of institutions that put 
constraints on politically important actors. More importantly, in parallel with the 
argument proposed in this study, they point to the “relative security of elites” in 
Botswana as an important factor that paved the way for a stable and democratic regime 
(ibid., 105). The democratic system that came into being following independence in 1966 
provided a road map for the traditional elite (i.e., cattle owners) to deal with political and 
economic issues. The discovery of copper and nickel deposits and “most crucially” 
kimberlite diamonds in the following years (ibid., 100) further strengthened the 
consensus over the rules of the game: Democracy. Likewise, Higley and Burton (2006, 
129, emphasis added) assign a prominent role to natural resources in explaining the stable 
democratic regime in Botswana. As they put it “…Botswana has had two important 
advantages: A small and ethnically homogeneous population, and plentiful diamond lodes 
that have yielded large export revenues with which to placate competing elites and their 
supporters and help keep politics peaceful.” 
                                                 
41 As they report “…Botswana has performed not only well, but better than any other country in the world 
in the last 35 years…Botswana had a PPP-adjusted income per capita of $5,796 in 1998, almost four times 
the African average, and between 1965 and 1998, it grew at an annual rate of 7.7 percent” (p. 80). 
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Obviously not all countries with varying degrees of democracy have the same 
institutional quality. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume a democratic regime (i.e., 
those that have taken a considerable step toward higher levels of democracy) will fare 
better than a non-democratic regime in terms of creating checks and balances and holding 
politicians accountable for their actions. Luciani (2005), one of the leading proponents of 
the rentier state theory, explains the different effect of oil revenues in Venezuela and 
Norway by the fact that these countries gained access to oil monies after they became 
democracies. 
Further, regardless of whether Przeworski et al. (1997; 2000) are right with their 
explanation of the economic development-democracy link or whether Epstein et al.’s 
(2006) critique of their works is valid, one point stands out: Higher levels of income help 
to sustain an incident of democratization. More specifically, as the students of democracy 
and democratization have consistently shown, higher levels of income by all means laid 
the groundwork for a more durable democratic regime. Indeed, if “no democracy fell 
ever, regardless of everything else, in a country with a per capita income higher 
than…$6,055”42 (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 164), countries with abundant mineral 
wealth, once they become democracies, have a better chance to sustain it than countries 
without such resources.  
Hypothesis 5-5: A change toward democracy is less likely to fail in countries with large 
mineral revenues.
                                                 
42 1985 PPP USD. 
 110
CHAPTER VI 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter dichotomous measures of democracy fail to 
distinguish between regimes with considerable popular elements and those without. The 
main focus of this study to tease out the dynamic of interactions between politically 
important groups in a society: That is, what accounts for a polity achieving greater 
participation (addressed in the previous chapter) and what factors influence the durability 
of such changes toward democracy. The unit of analysis, therefore, in this chapter, is the 
episode of change toward democracy (CTD). The analysis of the duration of CTDs 
necessarily includes only those cases that have had a considerable change toward 
democracy (CTD). Toward this end I analyze all CTDs that occurred between the 1960-
1999 period. For both theoretical and practical reasons, the sample excludes the 
established Western democracies that did not experience a CTD within the time frame 
under analysis. From a theoretical point of view it is less useful to examine these mature 
democracies due to because (1) their long democratic history might have masked 
important insights and changed the relationship between the variables of interests; (2) 
sustained high levels of economic development in Western European and North 
American democracies make it harder to identify the casual link between several 
variables used in this study (i.e., oil, economic inequality) and the outcome variable, 
duration of a democratic regime; and more importantly (3) none of these democratic 
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regimes has had a considerable regime change since the 1960s. Only those that 
experienced a CTD, such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, are included in the sample. The 
data were available for 79 cases for the period under analysis. The second reason is more 
practical: The data needed to test the propositions are available for only post-1960 period. 
Dependent Variable 
The outcome variable is the duration, in years, of an incident of democratization. 
Using the Polity IV data, I define the episode of change toward democracy as at least a 
three-point positive change in the Polity score over a period of three years or less. The 
event fails (ends) when that country experiences at least a three-point negative change in 
its Polity score or when the central political authority collapses. For the period under 
analysis the data were available for 79 CTDs for 55 countries. Of these 79 cases 20 of 
them failed within the time frame. Examples of how the duration of an incident of 
democracy is operationalized are provided in Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1. Operationalization of the dependent variable (change toward democracy). 
 
Country Name Year Change in the 
Polity Score 
Regime “Shift”* Failed?/Year 
Guatemala 1996 5 points (+3 to +8) Yes Right Censored 
Algeria 1989 7 points (-9 to –2) No Yes/1992  
Turkey 1961 5 points (+4 to +9) Yes Yes/1971 
*Regime “shift” is defined as a change from “autocracy” to a “partial democracy” or a “full democracy”, or 
a change from “partial democracy” to a “full democracy” (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual: 34).  
 
Independent Variables 
A set of the covariates was employed to model the relationship between the 
duration of an incident of democratization and social and economic transformation. In 
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addition to manufactures exports, agricultural raw materials exports, and fuel and ores 
and metals exports, as percentages of merchandise exports, and income inequality 
variables, I identified a variable to distinguish between events that were led or primarily 
influenced by the elites and those were not. 
Elites and Democratic Survival: Democratization is an ongoing struggle between those 
who occupy the upper echelons of a social order and those who are at the lower levels of 
the order. Although there is no clear boundary between the upper and lower levels of a 
social order, in most societies there exists an informal yet important division between 
elites and non-elites. 
How can one then identify who are elites and what groups comprise non-elites? 
Juan Linz’s (1978) initial typology identifies two modes of transitions: Reforma - a 
transition in which incumbents take the lead - and ruptura - a transition that follows the 
collapse of an authoritarian regime as a result of challenges initiated by the lower classes. 
In some cases an incident of democratization might come about as a result of both upper 
and lower classes involvement (a process Huntington calls transplacement and also 
referred to pacted). However, as Huntington (1991-1992) has put it, the line between 
“transformations” where “those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead” (p. 
590), and “transplacements” where democratization is brought about as a function of 
“combined actions of government and opposition” (p. 608) is “fuzzy and some cases 
might be legitimately classified in either category” (p. 591). 
In this study, the primary element that defines non-elites is being a new social 
actor and raising demands for having a say in the decision-making process. Therefore, the 
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opposition can be a leftist organization, a nationalist group, labor, peasants, bourgeoisie, 
or an ethnic/religious group. Such conceptualization requires, first, starting with an 
already established socio-political structure. After power is consolidated within a system, 
some will find themselves at the upper levels of the social order, whereas other groups 
will occupy lower strata. Over time interactions between upper and lower groups will 
generate some new social groups with demands for participation. What is important is 
that once a social and political power structure is established what determines the 
outcome of interactions between upper and lower levels of the structure.  
Second, this conceptualization also requires going beyond the conventional 
division between incumbent and opposition groups. Elites are groups or persons who can 
“affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Burton et al. 1992, 8). 
The incumbency position does not necessarily mean the power to produce “regular” and 
“substantial” political outcomes. The prominent role played by the elites does not suggest 
a static and irreversible hierarchy. Groups that occupy the lower levels of a social order 
might replace the elites over time. Once new elites consolidate their power and position 
within the system, new social actors with new demands will arise, and the ongoing 
struggle for power sharing will start again. The principal rule for power consolidation and 
becoming elites in the social order is whether the lower classes that took over the system 
are able to subdue challenges from within. 
The victory of lower classes (opposition) against the Iranian traditional elites in 
1979, for example, has been consolidated, and demands from new social actors for a say 
in the decision-making can be treated as a conflict between the new elites and new non-
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elites. Therefore, the change toward wider participation in 1982 in Iran is treated as a 
lower class-led change, whereas the change in 1996 is considered an elite-led change. By 
contrast, the lower classes in Nicaragua, led by the FSLN, designed and implemented two 
CTDs in 1981 and 1984 following their victory against the elites. Nonetheless, they were 
not able to consolidate their victory and had to make concessions to a new challenge to 
their power less than a decade later. Although, as the incumbents the FSLN initiated and 
designed the 1981 and 1984 CTDs, I have coded these changes as lower classes-led 
changes. 
Obviously, identifying the key actor(s) behind an episode is not an easy task. 
However, for analytical purposes one can locate the two broadly defined groups, elites 
and opposition (non-elites), along a continuum in terms of their relative impact on the 
formation and design of the change (see, for instance, Huntington 1991-1992, 583). To 
capture the elites’ role in sustaining an incident of democratization I defined a 
dichotomous variable equal 1 for cases primarily led by the elites and 0 for those in 
which the upper classes were excluded from designing the new regime.43 The lower 
classes will definitely have some influence on the process. The crucial point, however, is 
whether the CTD was predominantly designed and controlled by the elites. To give an 
example, the two democratic openings in Taiwan in 1987 and 1992 were affected by the 
opposition forces’ demands, yet they were designed, introduced, and controlled by the 
ruling elites (see, for instance, Huntington 1991-1992; Pang 1992; Lin 1998). 
                                                 
43 Countries that came into being as a democracy within the time-period under analysis, 1960-1999 (e.g., 
Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago), were treated as elite-led democracies. Excluding these countries from 
the analysis yielded substantially the same results. 
 115
Where the elites fail to provide a road map or an exit strategy (e.g., Guatemala 
1944, Argentina 1983) the change is most likely to be dominated by the non-elites and 
often accompanied by drastic redistributive economic policies (e.g., Nicaragua 1981; 
Spain 1931). CTDs led by lower classes are often identified with drastic redistributive 
policies, which may or may not be a consequence a social revolution. The Spanish 
democratization in 1931, for instance, constitutes a paradigmatic example. The victory of 
the Republicans and Socialists in the 1931 elections, which culminated in an 11-point 
increase on the Polity scale (from –6 to 7), was followed by dramatic political and 
economic events. On the one hand, regular elections with universal suffrage were 
introduced. On the other, the king was convicted of treason and his lands along with 
those of the Catholic Church and aristocracy were confiscated and redistributed (Higley 
and Burton 2006, 60).44 
Identifying the extent to which the elites were involved in a CTD is a daunting 
task, but numerous scholars have provided us with an in-depth analysis of a substantial 
number of democratization events. Collier (1999), for instance, in her Paths Toward 
Democracy, provides an excellent discussion of historical and recent democratization in 
Western Europe and South America with respect to the role of middle class and labor. 
Huntington (1991-1992), on the other hand, explains how more than thirty countries 
became democracies between 1974-1990, a period he calls the third wave of 
democratization. Further, Higley and Burton’s (2006) Elite Foundations of Liberal 
Democracy, Booth et al.’s (2006) Understanding Central America, and Yashar’s (1997) 
                                                 
44 The king left the country following the election results.   
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Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870-1950s 
were consulted to decide whether elites were alienated and excluded from the process of 
change. Where such studies were not available I primarily relied on Stearns’ (2001) The 
Encyclopedia of World History to code the elite involvement variable. For the list of 
cases see Appendix. 
Control Variables 
In addition to the control variables that were used in the previous analyses (GDP 
per capita, illiteracy rate, ethnic and religious fractionalization, percent Muslim, and 
population), other controls are needed because survival models are employed. 
First, some countries have experienced more than one CTD between 1960 and 
1999. The past democratic experiences are likely to influence the longevity of a new 
democratic opening. A country might learn from its previous experiences, making the 
new CTD less likely to fail. On the other hand, the same country might become more 
fragile as a function of its previous failures and thus become more vulnerable to another 
failure. A person with previous heart attacks is more likely to experience another one 
relative to someone with no such medical history. The main issue is whether the 
subsequent failure events are of the same kind as the previous ones (Cleves et al. 2002, 
40). In this study, each CTD is assumed to have the same hazard of failure; that is, the 
clock gets reset for every event. Nonetheless, treating these observations as if they are 
independent from each other might be misleading (Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 155). 
To mitigate this problem I employed two variables. First, a count variable was 
generated to identify the number of CTDs a country has experienced to that point. 
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Second, some countries have experienced consecutive events, where one CTD follows 
another one without a failure. To give an example, consider the change in the Guatemalan 
political system that culminated in a CTD in 1986: The Polity score for Guatemala 
increased by seven points (from –6 to +3). The system, however, experienced another 
improvement in 1996 by moving from +3 to +8 on the Polity2 scale without experiencing 
a failure. I argue that the second event should be treated as a new episode of change since 
the rules of the political game underwent important alterations. However, it is likely that 
the odds of failure for a CTD that comes after another one will be lower than a CTD 
without such previous experience. A dichotomous variable was generated to deal with 
this issue.45 
Third, as discussed earlier, the change from say –10 to –2 might be qualitatively 
different than and an event that involves a shift in regime. To control for this, I defined 
three dichotomous variables for cases that experienced a 3-point (event type 1), a 3-5 
point (event type 2), and 6 points and greater (event type 3) increase, respectively, in their 
Polity scores.46 Likewise, a variable was defined to control for cases that had a regime 
shift: If a CTD involves a regime shift from autocracy (-10,0) to a partial democracy (1,6) 
                                                 
45 The semi-parametric Cox model enables a researcher to control for this by using the “strata” option: This 
option allows the hazard rate vary by event number (see, Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 162). The Cox 
model, however, yielded similar results.    
46 Using the Polity IV measures of regime change produced very similar results. The Polity data set 
identifies three changes toward democracy. Cases that experienced at least a 3-point increase on the Polity 
scale without a “shift” are identified as “positive regime change” and are coded as “1”, cases that 
experienced 3 to 5 points increase with a “shift” are classified as “minor regime change” and are coded as 
“2”, and those that experienced an increase of 6 points or greater are identified as “major regime change” 
and are coded as “3” (see Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual, pp. 28, 34, 35). 
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or a full democracy (7,10) or a change from partial democracy to a full democracy a 
value of 1 was assigned to it, 0 otherwise.47 
Method 
Survival analysis is employed to analyze what accounts for the duration of an 
incident of democratization. Survival analysis allows one to analyze the time until an 
event occurs (Cleves et al. 2002). In this study the event (failure) is defined as at least a 
three-point negative change in the Polity score. A nation first has to experience CTD to 
enter the data set. Then failure occurs as a three-point drop in its Polity score or the 
collapse of the central government. 
There are two main advantages of using a survival analysis. First, it enables a 
researcher to control for the subjects that are not observed long enough to experience the 
event or to distinguish between cases that fail and those that are not observed long 
enough to fail within a given time period (Cleves et al. 2002; Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004). Second, the presence of the time component in survival data poses a serious 
challenge to use of linear regression. The assumed normality of the residuals in OLS is 
“unreasonable” for many events (Cleves et al. 2002, 2). 
The choice of a survival model is conditioned by whether a researcher has a 
theoretical reason to expect that the baseline hazard will follow a certain shape. 
Parametric models are appropriate when a researcher has an idea of what the baseline 
hazard looks like. If, however, a researcher does not want to place any restrictions on the 
                                                 
47 I would like to thank Idean Salehyan for drawing my attention to this point.  
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shape of the hazard, the semi-parametric Cox regression is more appropriate to analyze 
the survival data (Cleves et al. 2002, 186).  
Of the parametric survival models, the Weibull regression can produce a variety 
of monotonic hazard rates. It can provide monotonically increasing, decreasing, or flat 
shapes of the hazard function. The Log-Normal and Log-Logistic models, on the other 
hand, allow for non-monotonic hazards. The Cox regression, as an alternative to fully 
parametric models, does not place any restriction on the distributional form of the 
duration time, thus leaving the baseline hazard unspecified (Cleves at al. 2002; Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 
Theoretically, one can argue that the hazard rate for a CTD is more likely to 
follow a certain shape rather than being unknown. An incident of democratization might 
face a higher (or lower) probability of failure in the early periods than in the later periods, 
or the hazard might increase (or decrease) over time. As Gates et al. (2006, 899) put it, 
“political entrepreneurs are not going to construct a system of government that is 
expected to fail immediately. The implication is that…the hazard function would be 
expected to be nonmonotonic, such that the hazard of regime collapse initially increases 
and then, as consolidation mechanisms come into play, the hazard declines.” That is, in 
the early years the hazard will be low/high, then it will increase/decrease, and finally it 
will flatten at some point. Imagine the response of elites to a CTD: If they do not support 
the change, it is more likely that they will wait for some time to see how the new rules of 
the game influence their interests. After a certain time period, the conflict between pro-
and anti-regime groups will intensify. This conflict will either result in the regime’s 
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victory or the CTD will end. In any case, the hazard in the beginning will be low, then 
high, and then will become stable after the conflict ceases.  
Royston (2001) proposes that parametric proportional modeling be used to better 
capture the baseline hazard. This model, Royston (2001, 27) explains, “can throw light on 
additional important aspects of the data, aspects the Cox model is not designed to 
function.” The starting point for Royston’s parametric proportional modeling is the 
conception that the shape of the baseline hazard may not be proportional (the assumption 
that the Cox regression makes) or monotonic (the assumption the Weibull regression 
makes). However, since the hazard function can, in many instances, be of primary 
interest, leaving it unspecified or putting some restrictions on it might lead to omission of 
important aspects of the data.48 
Royston’s model provides a close look at the baseline hazard, which is extremely 
useful when one’s fundamental interest is to model the baseline hazard.49 However, it is 
more suitable for situations where the data are divided into some categories or groups and 
a researcher seeks to analyze how the shape of the hazard varies over time with regard to 
each group.50 When not the shape of the hazard but rather the effect of each covariate on 
                                                 
48 I would like to thank Ko Maeda for drawing my attention to this model. Royston applies this model to 
medical research. For an excellent application in political science, see Maeda and Nishikawa (2006). They 
analyze the duration of party control in parliamentary and presidential systems and find that these two 
systems of democratic governance produce different patterns of survival.  
49 Using a parametric proportional model one can check for the shape of the baseline hazard. I plotted the 
effect of “elite support” variable by changing this variable from “0” to “1” while holding all other 
continuous variables at their mean values and dichotomous variables at “0”. The baseline hazard showed 
dramatic changes when elite involvement is set equal to “0”. The hazard showed a sharp increase for the 
first few years then a decline and then flattening at about year 10. The shape when elite involvement is 1, 
however, was more stable and approximately monotonic. 
50 The example that Royston provides consists a sample of 686 node-positive breast cancer patients. The 
sample is divided into three groups - Good, Medium, Poor - by taking into account “the patient’s age, 
number of positive lymph nodes (a number that is positively and strongly associated with a poor 
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the outcome variable is of fundamental interest, using a parametric and/or semi-
parametric model is more appropriate (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 90-93). 
Since the primary concern of this study is to measure the effect of covariates on the 
hazard, the method proposed by Royston is used for diagnostic purposes only.  
In addition to the theoretical expectation, parametric models are more likely to 
produce more efficient estimates since they exploit all the information (Cleves et al. 
2002, 180). This point becomes more important when the data contain time-varying 
covariates. The Cox regression, for instance, ignores the variation in the time-varying 
variables (increases or decreases in the level of variables) given that the subject has 
survived the variation and no other failure occurred within the interval. Parametric 
models, however, control for such variation regardless of whether other failures occurred 
in the same interval (For a detailed discussion, see Cleves et al 2002, 182). 
The sample used in this study contains several time-varying covariates. That is, 
the values for most of the variables can change from year to year during the CTD 
episode. In addition to the theoretical argument made above regarding the shape of the 
hazard, due to the presence of several time varying covariates, one can argue that the 
either log-normal/logistic or Weibull regression is more appropriate to analyze the data. 
One way to choose among the parametric models is to look at the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and/or Bayesian Schwarz Criterion (BSC) values. The model that 
produces the lowest scores is the best at analyzing the data (see, for instance, Box-
                                                                                                                                                 
prognosis), the tumor grade, the tumor progesterone receptor status, and whether the patient has received 
hormonal treatment.” (2001, 6). Then a dummy variable is assigned to each group and the data (each 
group) is compared and analyzed using parametric proportional model. The main conclusion is that the 
hazard is indeed flexible and varies with time, a finding that would not be captured by using Cox and/or 
Weibull regressions.  
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Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The data were analyzed using Weibull, log-normal, log-
logistic, and exponential regressions. The AIC and BSC values are reported in Table 6-2.  
Table 6-2. AIC and BIC for four parametric models. 
 
Model AIC BSC 
Weibull 79.67 161.87 
Log-Normal 79.96 162.16 
Log-Logistic 79.24 161.44 
Exponential 95.76 173.63 
 
The log-logistic model seems to better fit the data. These results confirm the 
theoretical expectation that the hazard rate is more likely to be nonmonotonic (e.g., low 
in the early years, then increases, and flattens out as time passes). The difference between 
the AIC and BSC values obtained from the Weibull model and the log-logistic model, 
however, is rather small. Given that the hazard might also follow a monotonic shape (i.e., 
decline over time), I employed both log-logistic and Weibull parametric models to 
analyze the data. If the model is correctly specified, the semiparametric Cox and 
parametric regressions should produce very similar estimates. The Cox regression was 
employed to check the robustness of the findings and substantially the same results were 
obtained (not reported). 
Since most of the independent variables are time varying, their values at time t are 
most likely to be conditioned by their values at t-1. To deal with the temporal dependency 
problem and avoid over-confident p-values I used robust standard errors to adjust for 
clustering over the same country (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 131-133). As 
mentioned earlier, to confront the simultaneity problem between the covariates and the 
outcome variable, the percent of agriculture, minerals, manufactures, and fuel in total 
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exports, the income inequality, the GDP pc, the illiteracy rate, and the population 
variables were lagged one year. The GDP pc and population variables were logged to 
eliminate statistical (i.e., skewness) and computational issues.51 
Analysis 
Higher levels of democracy and the survival of a change toward democracy are 
conditioned by a society’s source of wealth, on the one hand, and by whether or not such 
change is initiated by established elites, on the other. When lower classes gain power 
without directly threatening the upper classes’ position within the system, demands for 
power sharing and participation are more likely to be accommodated. The odds for not 
only having a higher level of democracy but also a more sustainable one are conditioned 
by whether a society has undergone a social and economic transformation through which 
the opportunities for upward mobility are expanded and such mobility is no longer a 
direct threat to those occupying the upper echelons of the social and political structure. 
To test for the relationship between the durability of a democratic incident and 
socioeconomic transformation, I conducted a series of survival models. The statistical 
results are reported in Table 6-3. 
                                                 
51 The estimation without lagging these variables yields substantially similar results.  
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Table 6-3. Economic transformation, elite involvement, and sustainable change toward 
democracy, 1960-1999.    
 Log-Logistic Regression  Weibull Regression 






































































Scale Parameter .27 2.7 
Observation 559 559 
Number of Subjects  79 79 
Note: The entries for Weibull and Log-Logistic Models are hazards ratios and accelerated survival time, respectively.  
Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. The significance levels are based on 
one-tailed test for the independent variables. All others are two-tailed.   
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The results from log-logistic regression (Column 1 in Table 6-3) are reported in 
accelerated survival time. Therefore a positive coefficient indicates that the variable 
increases the survival time, whereas a negative sign indicates shorter duration. The 
estimation using Weibull regression (Column 2 in Table 6-3), however, is reported in 
hazard ratios: A coefficient less than one indicates a positive relationship (prolongs 
duration) between a variable and the duration of a CTD, whereas a coefficient greater 
than one indicates a negative relationship (shortens duration).  
The results from log-logistic and Weibull regressions not only provide support for 
the argument but also pose a challenge to the current findings on the relationship between 
democratic survival and economic development. The value of the scale parameters from 
log-logistic model, .27, confirms the theoretical expectation regarding the shape of the 
hazards: A value less than 1 suggests that the hazard rate first rises then begins to decline 
(see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 36). 
Notice that the log-logistic results are in accelerated survival time. However, they 
can be converted back to the hazard ratios by flipping the sign of the of the scale 
parameter, multiplying it with the coefficient, and then exponentiating this value (see 
Cleves et al. 2002, 187). Consider the effect of the elite involvement variable on the 
survival of an incident of democratization. The positive coefficient indicates that this 
variable increases the survival time for a CTD. The effect is equal to .91 [(exp(-.27*.34)] 
in terms of the hazard ratio: The elite support decreases the risk of a democratic failure by 
9 percent. This effect becomes more visible in Graph 2. The graph was produced by 
allowing the Elite Support variable to vary from 0 to 1 while holding other variables 
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constant. The cumulative hazard, as displayed in Graph 6-1, is much steeper when elites 
are excluded from the new regime (i.e., democratization); indicating the crucial role elites 
play in sustaining a democratic opening. 
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Of the proxies that were used to measure the relationship between economic 
transformation and sustainability of an incident of democratization manufactures exports 
clearly produce longer duration. Likewise, oil exports and economic inequality, as 
hypothesized, prolong a change toward democracy. These results are robust across the 
models. 
The Weibull regression results suggest that manufacturing exports decreases the 
probability of failure by 8 percent: Every 1 percent increase in manufactures exports 
decreases the odds of democratic failure by 8 percent. To provide a more visual 
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representation, the effect of varying levels of manufactures exports was graphed52 by 
hypothetically setting the variable at 30, 60, and 90 percents while holding other 
variables at their means. 
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As shown in Figure 6-2, as the manufactures exports raises from 30 percent to 90 
percent of total merchandise exports, the odds of a democratic breakdown (i.e., failure) 
substantially decline. Although the measure of increased wealth, the GDP pc, decreases 
the odds of failure, it is not significant at the 90 percent or better confidence level. This 
finding suggest that it is not increasing wealth per se that helps a democratic opening 
sustain, but rather it is a specific type of economic development that lays the groundwork 
                                                 
52 The Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 show the cumulative hazards obtained from using Log-logistic regression. 
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for upward mobility and reduction of threat directed to the established elites’ position 
within the system.  
The finding on fuel exports is striking. After a country experiences a CTD, every 
1 percent increase in its fuel exports decreases the odds of failure by almost 9 percent. 
This is contrary to current findings on the relationship between oil and democratic 
survival. Even if the current theoretical arguments and empirical findings regarding the 
relationship between abundant oil-revenues and democratization are true, this finding 
suggests that once a country passes a certain threshold (i.e., once a change toward more 
inclusive governance occurs) abundant oil-revenues can become a blessing rather than a 
curse. The effect of oil exports is graphed in Figure 6-3 by allowing this variable taking 
values 30, 60, and 90 percent of total exports while holding other variables in the model 
constant (i.e., at their means). This graph further clarifies how an increase in oil exports 
dampens the odds of an authoritarian backlash. 
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This finding not only supports the hypothesis #7, it also poses an important 
challenge to the current literature regarding the link between oil-wealth and democracy. 
How can one explain this? A cursory analysis of authoritarian backlashes reveals that 
economic crises account for most of the democratic failures. The mean GDP pc for 
observations that experienced a failure, for instance, was $1,762, with a standard 
deviation of $.81, (versus a mean of $4,321, with a standard deviation of $2,556 for those 




                                                 
53 To eliminate a possible multicollinearity problem between the “fuel” and “GDP pc” variables, I 
conducted the analyses without the latter variable and obtained similar results.   
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Table 6-4. The failed cases, 1960-1999.  
 
Country Name Year GDP pc ($) Oil (% exports) 
Algeria 1992 2,719 95.85 
Bangladesh 1975 957 .09 
Bolivia 1980 2,044 23.66 
Burkina Faso 1980 457 .11 
Ecuador 1961 1,961 18.36 
El Salvador 1977 2,244 .68 
Ghana 1972 942 .81 
Ghana 1981 936 12.31 
Guatemala 1974 226 .07 
Nigeria 1984 1,068 95.15 
Pakistan 1977 969 4.29 
Peru 1992 2,092 6.47 
South Korea 1972 1,845 1.12 
Thailand 1971 1,483 .82 
Thailand 1976 1,779 .02 
Thailand 1991 3,756 1 
Turkey 1971 2,368 .44 
Turkey 1980 2,955 1.43 
Uganda 1969 653 .55* 
Zambia 1972 1,185 .06 
Zimbabwe 1983 1,364 .05 
*This value is for year 1980. 
 
Could this be a fluke or an artifact stemming from a selection bias? That is, one 
could argue that oil-abundant countries are less likely to make a transition to wider 
participation in the first place; if they do they are less likely to fail. It is worthwhile to 
note, however, that the number of cases that have survived or not experienced a 
democratic breakdown is far more than a few. Besides the observation that only 2 cases 
of the 20 failures were oil-rich countries, Table 6-5 demonstrates that, of the remaining 




Table 6-5. Oil-rich democratic regimes that have not failed, 1960-1999. 
 
















It should be noted that despite a strong expectation of a negative relationship 
between oil- wealth, as a fixed asset, and transition to and survival of a democratic 
regime, Boix (2003) fails to find any statistically significant relationship for his 
proposition that abundant oil-wealth increases the odds of a democratic breakdown. On 
the contrary, he notes (2003, 86) that none of the oil-rich democracies that were included 
in his sample (i.e., Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) has experienced a 
failure. He concludes “with such low number of cases, any conclusions about the impact 
of oil on an authoritarian backlash can only be tentative.” 
Although I emphasize the effect of fuel revenues on democratization (i.e., exclude 
natural resources such as diamonds) the evidence from perhaps the most stable and 
democratic regime in Africa, Botswana,54 strengthens the positive effect of the oil-
                                                 
54 Botswana has been a democracy since its independence in 1966 and as of 2003 it has a value of 9 on the 
Polity IV composite measure of democracy that ranges from –10 to +10.  
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wealth, as a natural resource, on the survival of democracy. As noted earlier, “…pl
diamond lodes that have yielded large export revenues” have played a significant positive 
role to “placate competing elites and their supporters and help keep politics peaceful” 
(Higley and Burton 2006, 129, emphasis added). This conclusion is in accordance with 
the argument made above: Large resource wealth can provide enough revenues to meet 
the social demands, thereby reducing the odds of a democratic collapse. The sign of the 
second measure of the strength of mineral economy, non-fuel minerals, is in the expected 
direction and confirms the coefficient on the fuel variable. This effect, however, is not 
discernible from zero. 
entiful 
The findings from this study confirm Boix’s and others’ (e.g., Luciani 1987; Ross 
2001) findings on the link between a mineral economy and transition to democracy (i.e., 
a mineral economy blocks a transition to wider participation by providing a mix of 
positive and negative incentives for the members of a society). However, it also clearly 
indicates that there is a strong need for going beyond the prevalent view on the 
relationship between oil-wealth and democratization and to question the categorical 
denial of any positive relationship between mineral-wealth and democracy. In the line 
with Przeworski et al.’s (1997; 2000) and Collier’s (1999) works, this study strengthens 
the proposition that the dynamics of transition to and survival of an incident of 
democratization are different. Differently put, once a country takes an important step 
toward wider participation, abundant mineral-revenues (i.e., oil-revenues) substantially 
decreases the risk of an authoritarian backlash by providing large revenues for the 
members of a society. 
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Likewise, the coefficient on the economic inequality variable is statistically and 
substantially significant and contrary to the current findings, suggests a positive 
relationship between sustaining a democratic regime and higher levels of inequality. 
Recall this variable can hypothetically range from 0 (most equal) to 100 (least equal). 
Therefore, higher values indicate higher levels of inequality: The larger the gap between 
the poor and the rich, the more likely a democratic regime will survive. The Weibull 
regression coefficient suggests that for every one-unit increase in inequality, the odds for 
a democratic failure are reduced by 21 percent.55  
This finding indicates that the gap between upper and lower classes is not an 
obstacle to the survival of a CTD as long as the socio-economic structure provides 
alternative avenues to power and it is perceived as just and legitimate. As Bollen and 
Jackman have aptly stated regarding the assumption that inequality undermines the 
legitimacy of a regime, “…to have such an effect, inequality has to be perceived as 
unjust, and there is no reason to believe that inequality automatically generates 
perceptions of inequity.” They continue, “even in the presence of high inequality, 
regimes can maintain a degree of legitimacy by invoking other political symbols – for 
example, those that appeal to nationalists sentiments” (Bollen and Jackman 1985, 440, 
452; also see Bollen and Jackman 1995) (1985, 452). 
Further, the narrower discrepancy between upper and lower classes in developed 
(i.e., democratic) countries does not necessarily indicate that lower classes impose re-
distributive policies on the rich, as the proponents of the inequality-democracy nexus 
                                                 
55 Using Vanhanen’s (2003) “family farms” variable as an indicator of inequality yielded very similar 
results.  
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argue. On the contrary, as noted earlier, a narrower gap “…has been facilitated by the 
over-all increase of national income…not so much by reduction of the income of the 
relatively rich as by the faster growth of the income of the relatively poor” Lipset (1960, 
64). 
This finding, with the finding on the Elite Support variable, shows that the 
support of the established elites for an incident of democratization is vital to the CTD’s 
survival. Over time, established elites may or may not lose their privileges. However, if 
their status is threatened during the transition period (i.e., they are not a part of the new 
regime) power imbalances between the rich and the poor will result in a conflict in which 
the rich are more likely to prevail. Lipset notes (1960, 79) where traditional elite was 
excluded from the new regime they have sometimes continued for generations to reject 
legitimacy of the new regime.56 Lipset (ibid.) argues that the crisis of legitimacy might 
have severe consequences for the durability of the emerging regime: One of the main 
sources of the legitimacy of the new regime lies in the “the continuity of important 
traditional integrative institutions during a transitional period.” 
The case of Botswana not only provides evidence for the positive effects of 
mineral wealth in democratic regime but also imply other important dimensions of 
democratic survival. It is worth noting that Botswana is one of the most unequal countries 
in the world: “…assets (primarily cattle) and income [inequality] is extremely high in 
Botswana, indeed as high as in South Africa and on a par with Latin American countries 
such as Brazil and Colombia. Comprehensive data on inequality in Botswana was 
                                                 
56 Regarding the role of traditional elites on sustaining a democracy, Lipset points that ten out of twelve 
European and English-speaking democracies monarchies.   
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collected in 1985-86 and 1993-94 and suggest a Gini coefficient of 0.56 and 0.54 for the 
two periods” (Acemoglu et al. 2003, 85). High levels of inequality, by themselves do not 
explain much. Inequalities provide a good proxy for the leverage powerful actors have in 
the system. That is, the link between higher levels of economic inequalities and 
democratic survival is elites. To the extent a democratic regime does not threaten the 
upper classes’ position on the social ladder (in other words to the extent it benefits them) 
they will abide by the rules of the game. In Botswana “the primary beneficiaries of 
government policy in the areas of economic and rural development have been the 
organizational elites, bureaucratic, professional, and political, who dominate the system” 
(Picard (1987, 264, emphasis added). 
Of the control variables, GDP per capita is weakly significant (p-value=.18, two-
tail) in log-logistic model and increases the survival time. As expected, higher levels of 
illiteracy increase the odds of failure, yet this effect is discernible only in Model 1. The 
effects of the ethnic and religious fragmentation variables are not robust across models: 
Religious fractionalization seems to increase survival time in log-logistic model whereas 
ethnic fractionalization increases the odds of failure in Weibull model. Countries with 
large populations are much more likely to experience a failure than countries with smaller 
populations. This effect is robust in both models and provides evidence for the argument 
that a large population reduces the number of alternative paths for upward mobility, 
which in turn leads to conflict among the members of a society and the collapse of the 
regime. The results show some support for the consecutive CTD variable, which is 
further strengthened by the finding on the Event Count variable: A democratic incident 
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that follows a previous improvement has a higher probability of survival and countries 
with prior democratic histories are less likely to fail. The Type 3 change (an increase of 
six points or grater on the Polity scale) seems to be the most fragile change. As compared 
to Type 1 (an increase of three points on the Polity scale) change (the base category), a 
dramatic increase on the polity scale substantially increases the odds of failure. The Type 
2 change (an increase of three-five points on the Polity scale), on the other hand, helps 
prolong a CTD. Combined with the findings on the previous CTD and Event Count 
variables, the results suggest important policy implications for the gradual nature of 
democratization. Democratic changes that involve a dramatic increase on the Polity scale 
(e.g., a change from –3 to 5) are more likely to fail than those involve relatively speaking 
a smaller increase (e.g., from –3 to 2). Finally, being a predominantly Muslim country 
does not increase the odds of failure: A country with a predominantly Muslim population 
is no more likely to experience a failure than a country with little or no Muslim 
population. Muslim countries that have experienced a change toward democracy (e.g., 
Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, Algeria) have been able to sustain their regimes. 
Conclusion 
This study started with a puzzle: Under what conditions does a society become 
more democratic, allowing previously disfranchised groups to become a part of the 
decision-making body, and what accounts for the sustainability of such a change? 
Building upon previous studies I argue that the causal relationship between economic 
development and democratization is not necessarily a function of increased wealth. The 
relationship between an increase in wealth and democratization is conditioned by whether 
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such an increase provides alternative paths for the lower classes to gain strength without 
threatening the established elites’ position within the system. As such, the initiation and 
sustainability of any substantial change toward power-sharing and democratization 
becomes a function of two intertwined factors: The nature of wealth that enables lower 
classes to move upward within the social and political structure, and the degree to which 
groups that occupy the upper levels of the social ladder are not directly threatened by 
such movement. 
The findings are striking regarding the relationship between the nature of wealth, 
economic development, elite involvement and democratization. First and foremost, elite 
involvement is an essential part of democratic survival, and the gap between upper and 
lower classes can indeed help reduce the odds of failure for a change toward democracy. 
As such, the findings confirm Burton et al.’s (1992) and Higley and Burton’s (2006, 1) 
central proposition regarding the “sine qua non” element in democracies: Elite support. 
The relationship between abundant natural resources and democratization is not 
straightforward. Contrary to the current findings regarding the debilitating effect of 
abundant natural resources on democratization, the fuel export variable suggest that once 
a country passes a certain threshold, this effect becomes positive. That is, abundant oil-
revenues help to sustain a change toward democracy. The insignificant relationship 
between mineral and agricultural exports suggest that the dynamics of democratic 




The theory I have proposed in this study to determine the genesis of regime 
transition in general and of democracy in particular emphasizes the role of elites in the 
transition to and survival of democratizing changes. It links their role to the 
socioeconomic structure of the nation. As such it contributes to the current literature by 
clarifying the casual mechanisms at play in democratizing changes. This study clearly 
shows that, contrary to the proponents of structural theories of democracy, neither a 
specific social class (i.e., bourgeoisie, labor) nor economic equalities account for the 
establishment of democratic regimes. Rather, whether a class will become an agent of 
stagnation or change (i.e., whether it will block a change toward wider participation or 
push for it) is closely associated with its position on the socioeconomic ladder. To the 
extent a change threatens a class’ position on the ladder, it will try to block the change. 
To the extent that a change improves a class’ position on the ladder, it will push for it. To 
the extent that a class’ privileged position is not threatened it will not oppose such 
change. 
This study has shown that the decision to open the system by allowing previously 
excluded segments of a society to have a voice in the system is a function of the nature of 
the society’s wealth resources. Societies that possess abundant natural resources, as the 
proponents of rentier state theory contend, tend to opt for exclusionary politics. The 
findings from several resource-rich countries and from statistical analyses confirm this 
hypothesis. However, the casual linkage between abundant natural resources and 
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authoritarianism is not precisely due to the source of income. What gives strong 
incentives to the owners of natural resources for exclusionary politics is not the large 
revenues obtained from exporting those resources per se. Rather it is the nature of those 
wealth resources that generates a substantial fear of democratization among the owners, 
thereby reinforcing authoritarian tendencies. The findings lend support to the conclusion 
reached by Boix (2003) and Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) that abundant natural 
resource wealth brings about distributional issues and gives the owners of those resources 
incentives to cling to power at all cost. Not all natural resources, however, have the same 
impact. The empirical analyses do not support a negative relationship between an 
agricultural economic structure and democratization. The democratization movements in 
several countries with large agricultural sectors (e.g., Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador) 
provide evidence for the possibility of democratization in countries with large agrarian 
economies. A closer look at regime changes in these countries reveals important insights: 
The assumed negative relationship between an agrarian economy and democracy is not 
exactly due to the large agrarian sector but rather to whether elites derive a large portion 
of their income from the land. This finding strengthens the need to account for the elites’ 
role in the formation of democratic systems of governance. The assumed negative 
relationship seems to be an artifact of whether elites derive their income primarily from 
the land itself, an economic structure in which demands from lower classes are more 
likely to be of a radical nature, thereby generating conflict and exclusionary politics 
(Paige 1975). As the details from democratization events in countries such as El Salvador 
and Guatemala illustrate, a change in the elites’ interests, such as the transformation of 
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elites from landowners and growers to exporters and intermediaries (Paige 1997) can 
pave the way to wider participation. This lends support to the centrality of elites for a 
substantial change to occur: So long as upper classes do not derive a large amount of their 
revenues from the land, a strong agrarian economy ceases to be an obstacle to wider 
participation. It should be noted that the agricultural sector’s share in total GDP was 
about 25 percent in Costa Rica (the most stable and democratic country in Latin America) 
and Guatemala (the most repressive and unstable regime in the region) in the early 1980s. 
The Costa Rican elites, however, have not been dependent upon the land as their primary 
income source. 
The most striking finding of this study, however, is that the dynamics of transition 
to and survival of a democratic regime are quite different. Factors that reduce the chances 
for greater participation can become important tools to sustain the very same 
democratizing change if it does occur. More specifically abundant oil revenues, a factor 
that lowers the prospects for democratization, prolongs the democratic regime once a step 
is taken toward democracy. Often scholars dismiss any positive effect of oil wealth on 
democracy. As this study clearly demonstrates, however, the oil effect is not clear-cut. 
After the introduction of checks and balances following the transition to a more 
democratic regime, oil wealth helps sustain the regime by “ameliorat[ing] the perverse 
political incentives” (Robinson et al. 2006, 450) associated with oil-wealth and 
“placat[ing] competing elites and their supporters” (Higley and Burton 2006, 129) by 
generating large revenues to overcome the economic crises often associated with the 
breakdown of democratic regimes. 
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The findings on economic inequality further strengthen the vitality of elite support 
for a democratic regime to endure. As noted earlier, higher levels of economic 
inequalities provide a good proxy for the leverage powerful actors have in the system. 
That is, the linkage between higher levels of economic inequalities and democratic 
survival is elites. Where economic inequality persists after a change toward democracy, 
established elites are less threatened by the change to democracy and therefore have less 
incentive to take steps to reverse that change. 
In the light of the findings it is appropriate to end the discussion with a current 
illustration of their utilities: New democracies. More specifically, what are the prospects 
for democratic survival in a country like Iraq? The theory and findings on the survival of 
a democratic system of governance clearly shed light on the future of the fledgling 
democratic institutions in Iraq, a Muslim country with abundant oil-revenues and a 
fragmented population. The theory proposed here suggests that ethnic and religious 
fragmentation or Islamic culture is not in itself an obstacle for a durable democracy. 
More importantly, however, abundant oil-revenues, as the theory and the findings 
demonstrate, can help sustain a democratic opening. One point, however, needs to be 
emphasized. The biggest threat to survival of the new democratic change in Iraq is the 
exclusion of the elites from the power-sharing mechanism. By and large, the old 
established elites (the ex-Baathists) are not a part of the new regime. The 
conceptualization of the elites and lower classes adopted in this study clearly suggests 
that the former members of the Saddam’s governing coalition, despite their replacement 
with the former non-elites (i.e., Kurds and Shiites), are still the most powerful group 
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within the country. Put differently, the incumbent groups (Kurds and Shiites) have not 
consolidated their power against the seemingly deposed ex-Baathists. Therefore, the 
prospects for a durable democratic regime in Iraq will primarily be conditioned by the 
incorporation of the established elites (ex-Baathists) into the new regime. Contrary to 
what perhaps many observers would argue the findings from this study, imply higher 
chances for the survival of the new regime in Iraq than that of in Afghanistan. To the 
extent the ex-Baathists are incorporated into new regime, it will have greater chances to 
survive, due mainly to larger revenues extracted from oil exports. Although the 
expectation regarding the low chances for a change toward democracy to survive in an 
agrarian economic structure is not supported by the statistical analyses, extreme poverty, 
the lack of an industrial economy, high illiteracy rate, and more importantly the failure of 
the politically important groups’ to establish a functioning state structure in Afghanistan 




CTDs FOR WHICH THE DATA ARE AVAILABLE FOR 1960-1999 PERIOD 
 
Case Years Elite Support? Failed? 
Dominican Republic 1979-1984 Yes Yes 
Trinidad and Tobago 1975- Yes No 
Mexico 1978-1987 Yes No 
Mexico 1988-1996 Yes No 
Mexico 1997- Yes No 
Guatemala 1972-1974 Yes Yes 
Guatemala 1986-1995 Yes No 
Guatemala 1996- Yes No 
Honduras 1982- Yes No 
El Salvador 1971-1977 Yes Yes 
El Salvador 1984- Yes No 
Nicaragua 1981-1983 No No 
Nicaragua 1984-1990 No No 
Panama 1989- No No 
Venezuala 1969- Yes No 
Ecuador 1972-1978 Yes No 
Ecuador 1979-2000 Yes Yes 
Peru 1980-1992 Yes Yes 
Brazil 1988- Yes No 
Bolivia 1978-1980 Yes Yes 
Bolivia 1982- Yes No 
Chile 1989- Yes No 
Argentina 1983- No No 
Uruguay 1985- Yes No 
Spain 1978- Yes No 
Portugal 1976- No No 
Poland 1991- Yes No 
Hungary 1990- Yes No 
Greece 1975- No No 
Cyprus 1974 Yes No 
Bulgaria 1990- Yes No 
Moldova 1991- Yes No 
Romania 1990-1995 Yes No 
Russia 1992-1999 Yes No 
Latvia 1991- Yes No 
Senegal 1978-1999 Yes No 
Burkina Faso 1970-1977 Yes No 
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Burkina Faso 1978-1980 Yes Yes 
Ghana 1970-1972 Yes Yes 
Ghana 1979-1981 Yes Yes 
Cameroon  1992- Yes No 
Nigeria 1979-1984 Yes Yes 
Central African Republic 1993-2003 Yes Yes 
Kenya 1997-2001 Yes No 
Mozambique 1994- Yes No 
Zambia 1964-1972 Yes Yes 
Zimbabwe 1970-1983 Yes Yes 
Malawi 1994- No No 
South Africa 1994- Yes No 
Mauritius  1968- Yes No 
Algeria 1989-1992 No Yes 
Algeria 1995- Yes No 
Tunisia 1987- Yes No 
Iran 1982-1997 No No 
Turkey 1962-1971 Yes Yes 
Turkey 1973-1980 Yes Yes 
Turkey 1983- Yes No 
Jordan 1989- Yes No 
South Korea 1963-1972 Yes Yes 
South Korea 1988- Yes No 
Pakistan 1973-1977 No Yes 
Pakistan 1985-1987 Yes No 
Pakistan 1988-1999 Yes Yes 
Bangladesh 1972-1975 Yes Yes 
Bangladesh 1978-1982 Yes Yes 
Nepal 1981-1989 Yes No 
Nepal 1990-2002 Yes Yes 
Thailand 1969-1971 Yes Yes 
Thailand 1974-1976 No Yes 
Thailand 1978-1991 Yes Yes 
Thailand 1992- Yes No 
Malaysia 1971- Yes No 
Philippines 1983-1986 Yes No 
Philippines 1987- Yes No 
Papua New GuineA 1975- Yes No 
Fiji 1970-1987 Yes Yes 
Fiji 1990- Yes No 
Note: The dates specify the beginning and end of each case. Some cases (e.g., Guatemala 1986-1995) 
followed by another CTD without experiencing a failure. For some cases the data are not available for the 
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